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Abstract	
Current	 theory	 of	 mind	 research	 faces	 the	 challenge	 of	 reconciling	 two	 sets	 of	
seemingly	 incompatible	 findings:	While	 children	 come	 to	 solve	 explicit	 verbal	 false	 belief	
(FB)	 tasks	 from	 around	 age	 4,	 recent	 studies	 with	 various	 less	 explicit	 measures	 such	 as	
looking	time,	anticipatory	looking	and	spontaneous	behavior	suggest	that	even	infants	can	
succeed	 on	 some	 FB	 tasks.	 In	 response	 to	 this	 tension,	 two-systems	 theories	 propose	 to	
distinguish	between	an	early-developing	system,	tracking	simple	forms	of	mental	states,	and	
a	 later-developing	 system,	 based	 on	 fully-developed	 concepts	 of	 belief	 and	 other	
propositional	attitudes.	One	prediction	of	such	theories	is	that	the	early-developing	system	
has	signature	limits	concerning	aspectuality.	We	tested	this	prediction	in	two	experiments.	
The	first	experiment	showed	(in	line	with	previous	findings)	that	2-	to	3-year-olds	take	into	
account	 a	protagonist’s	 true	or	 false	belief	 about	 the	 location	of	 an	object	 in	 their	 active	
helping	behavior.	In	contrast,	toddlers’	helping	behavior	did	not	differentiate	between	true	
and	 false	 belief	 conditions	when	 the	protagonist’s	 belief	 essentially	 involved	 aspectuality.	
Experiment	2	replicated	these	findings	with	a	more	stringent	method	designed	to	rule	out	
more	parsimonious	explanations.	Taken	together,	the	present	findings	are	compatible	with	
the	possibility	that	early	theory	of	mind	reasoning	is	subject	to	signature	limits	as	predicted	
by	the	two-systems	account.		
	
Keywords:	theory	of	mind,	two-systems	theory,	signature	limits	
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Are	there	signature	limits	in	early	theory	of	mind?	
	
Current	Theory	of	Mind	(ToM)	research	faces	what	has	been	termed	the	“puzzle	of	
belief	 reasoning”	 (Helming,	 Strickland,	 &	 Jacob,	 2014).	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 decades	 of	
research	with	a	variety	of	mostly	verbal	false	belief	(FB)	tasks	suggests	that	children	acquire	
the	 competence	 to	 ascribe	 beliefs	 around	 age	 4	 (for	 review,	 see	 the	 meta-analysis	 of	
Wellman,	Cross,	&	Watson,	2001).	Numerous	 findings	 indicate	 that	 the	emergence	of	 this	
competence	is	not	a	local	phenomenon,	affecting	performance	on	one	or	two	isolated	tasks.	
Instead	the	competence	reveals	itself	 in	systematically	 inter-correlated	ways	on	a	range	of	
superficially	 diverse	 tasks	 where	 the	 common	 denominator	 of	 these	 tasks	 is	merely	 that	
they	require	an	understanding	of	representation	(for	review,	see	Perner	&	Roessler,	2012).		
This	development	thus	seems	to	be	best	described	as	a	conceptual	revolution:	it	is	the	novel	
acquisition	of	a	comprehensive	and	unitary	cognitive	capacity.		
But	 a	 rapidly	 growing	 body	 of	 new	 evidence	 suggests	 that	 infants	 and	 toddlers	
perform	 competently	 on	 implicit	 FB	 tasks	well	 before	 age	 4	 (for	 reviews,	 see	Baillargeon,	
Scott,	 &	 Bian,	 2016;	 Baillargeon,	 Scott,	 &	 He,	 2010;	 Carruthers,	 2013).	 Violation-of-
expectation	tasks	have	found	that	infants	look	longer	at	events	in	which	a	protagonist	acts	
in	 a	 way	 that	 does	 not	 fit	 her	 beliefs	 (e.g.,	 Onishi	 &	 Baillargeon,	 2005;	 Surian,	 Caldi,	 &	
Sperber,	2007).	Anticipatory	looking	studies	have	shown	that,	from	the	second	year	of	life	or	
earlier,	children,	just	like	adults,	look	in	anticipation	to	where	an	actor	is	going	to	act	based	
on	her	beliefs	(Clements	&	Perner,	1994;	Rubio-Fernández,	2013;	Schneider,	Bayliss,	Becker,	
&	 Dux,	 2012;	 Southgate,	 Senju,	 &	 Csibra,	 2007).	 Studies	 with	 interactive	 measures	 have	
shown	that	infants	and	toddlers	can	spontaneously	help	and	inform	others	in	ways	that	are	
sensitive	 to	 the	 recipient’s	 beliefs	 (D.	 Buttelmann,	 Carpenter,	 &	 Tomasello,	 2009;	 D.	
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Buttelmann,	Over,	Carpenter,	&	Tomasello,	2014;	Knudsen	&	Liszkowski,	2012;	Southgate,	
Chevallier,	&	Csibra,	2010).		
	
Three	competing	accounts	of	early	implicit	ToM	findings	
How	 can	 these	 two	 seemingly	 incompatible	 sets	 of	 findings	 be	 reconciled?	 Three	
main	theoretical	responses	to	this	puzzle	of	belief	reasoning	are	currently	under	discussion.		
Late	 competence	accounts	 claim	 that	proper	ToM	capacities	 are	only	 required	 for	 solving	
explicit	 tasks,	whereas	 the	new	 implicit	 tasks	using	 looking	time	and	 interaction	measures	
reflect	much	 simpler	 cognitive	 capacities	 (Heyes,	 2014;	 Ruffman	&	 Perner,	 2005;	 Sirois	&	
Jackson,	 2007).	 	 According	 to	 such	 accounts,	 many	 of	 the	 looking	 time	 studies	 can	 be	
explained	by	 low-level	processes	such	as	a	novelty	preference	(Heyes,	2014)	or	the	use	of	
simple	behavior	rules	(Ruffman	&	Perner,	2005).		
Early	competence	accounts	argue	the	converse.	According	to	these	accounts,	implicit	
tasks	are	the	true	indicator	of	ToM	capacities.	Younger	children’s	failures	on	explicit	FB	tasks	
do	 not	 reflect	 a	 deficit	 in	 ToM	 but	merely	 extraneous	 demands	 imposed	 by	 these	 tasks.		
These	demands	are	extraneous	in	the	sense	that	they	have	nothing	to	do	with	ToM	per	se,	
but	only	with	 linguistic	 and	other	 aspects	of	 the	explicit	 task	 structure	 (Baillargeon	et	 al.,	
2010;	Carruthers,	2013;	Leslie,	2005).		
Two-systems	 accounts	 oppose	both	 late	 and	 early	 competence	 accounts.	 	 Instead,	
they	claim,	 implicit	 tasks	do	 tap	ToM	abilities	of	 some	kind,	but	 these	precocious	abilities	
are	distinct	from	the	later-developing	conceptual	capacities	measured	in	explicit	tasks	(e.g.	
(Apperly	 &	 Butterfill,	 2009;	 Low,	 Apperly,	 Butterfill,	 &	 Rakoczy,	 2016;	 Perner	 &	 Roessler,	
2012;	Rakoczy,	2012).		On	such	views,	younger	children’s	failures	on	explicit	FB	tasks	is	not	
merely	a	consequence	of	extraneous	demands	but	reflects	a	true	conceptual	deficit.		
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On	 a	 particularly	 promising	 two-systems	 account	 (Apperly	 &	 Butterfill,	 2009;	
Butterfill	 &	 Apperly,	 2013;	 Low	 et	 al.,	 2016),	 there	 are	 at	 least	 two	 systems	 for	 tracking	
beliefs	and	other	mental	 states,	which	we	shall	 label	S1	and	S2.	Relative	 to	S2,	 system	S1	
trades	flexibility	for	gains	in	efficiency	by	relying	on	a	simpler	model	of	mental	states.	S1	is	
therefore	 limited	 in	ways	that	S2	 is	not.	For	our	purposes,	 the	crucial	 limit	 is	 that	S1	does	
not	enable	tracking	false	beliefs	essentially	involving	aspectuality.	To	illustrate	aspectuality,	
consider	 a	 popular	 film.	 Lois	 Lane	 is	 yet	 to	 discover	 that	 Clark	 Kent	 is	 Superman.	 She	
simultaneously	believes	that	Superman	is	with	her	and	that	Clark	Kent	is	elsewhere.	She	has	
incompatible	beliefs	about	one	and	the	same	person	under	two	different	aspects.	Only	S2	is	
capable	of	tracking	Lois’	beliefs,	which	essentially	involve	aspectuality.	Suppose	that	success	
on	 implicit	 FB	 tasks	 is	 a	 consequence	 of	 S1	 only,	 whereas	 success	 on	 explicit	 FB	 tasks	
requires	 S2.	 In	 that	 case,	 infants’	 performance	 should	 exhibit	 the	 limits	 of	 S1.	 They	may	
succeed	on	many	implicit	FB	tasks	which	do	not	essentially	involve	aspectuality,	such	as	the	
many	 tasks	 which	 involve	 simple	 mistakes	 about	 location	 only.	 	 But	 where	 FB	 tasks	
essentially	involve	aspectuality,	infants	should	not	succeed.	Or	so	this	two-systems	account	
implies.	
		
Which	of	the	three	accounts	is	right?	
Late	competence	accounts	become	less	and	less	plausible	as	more	and	more	findings	
from	various	implicit	tasks	converge.		But	the	empirical	situation	so	far	remains	inconclusive	
between	early	competence	and	two-systems	accounts.	This	is	because	most	existing	
research	has	considered	tasks	for	which	the	early	competence	and	two-systems	accounts	
make	the	same	predictions.	To	illustrate,	consider	change-of-location	FB	tasks:	the	
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protagonist	is	present	when	an	object	O	is	put	into	container	1,	absent	when	it	is	then	
transferred	to	container	2,	and	the	question	is	where	subjects	will	expect	the	protagonist	
finally	to	search	for	O.		Early	competence	accounts	claim	that	infants	operate	with	fully-
fledged	propositional	attitude	concepts	and	should	thus	succeed	on	such	FB	tasks.		The	two-
systems	account	claims	that	infants	operate	with	relational	attitudes	only.	This	is	sufficient	
for	tracking	false	beliefs	about	location	and	infants	should	succeed	on	such	FB	tasks.		To	
distinguish	early	competence	from	two-systems	accounts	we	must	therefore	look	to	other	
tests.	
The	two-systems	account	makes	clear	and	testable	predictions	concerning	implicit	
and	explicit	FB	tasks.	Concerning	explicit	tasks,	the	two-systems	account	predicts	that	
whether	or	not	a	task	requires	dealing	with	aspectuality	should	make	little	difference:	
competence	in	different	FB	tasks	should	emerge	in	synchrony,	and	performance	should	be	
highly	inter-correlated.	This	prediction	is	shared,	naturally,	with	early	competence	accounts.	
But	early	competence	accounts	predict	the	same	pattern	of	unity	and	convergence	for	
implicit	tasks	as	well.	By	contrast,	the	two-systems	account	predicts	disunity	and	
dissociation.	Infants’	(and	others’)	performance	on	implicit	tasks	should	depend	on	whether	
the	task	requires	dealing	with	aspectuality.	Young	children	may	master	change-of-location	
and	related	implicit	FB	tasks,	but	should	not	succeed	on	tasks	that	necessitate	grasp	of	
aspectuality.		
	
The	empirical	state	of	the	art	
What	is	the	state	of	the	existing	evidence	vis-à-vis	these	predictions?		Concerning	
unity	of	performance	in	various	explicit	FB	tasks	in	older	children,	earlier	studies	directly	
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investigating	young	children’s	understanding	of	aspectuality	found	evidence	for	disunity	and	
dissociation:	children	mastered	tasks	of	aspectuality	understanding	only	some	years	after	
passing	standard	FB	tasks	(Apperly	&	Robinson,	1998;	Kamawar	&	Olson,	1999,	2011;	
Russell,	1987;	Sprung,	Perner,	&	Mitchell,	2007).	But	more	recent	research	suggests	that	
these	findings	masked	children’s	competence	due	to	extraneous	task	(Rakoczy,	2017;	
Rakoczy,	Fizke,	Bergfeld,	&	Schwarz,	2015).		These	new	studies	have	developed	simplified	
aspectual	tasks.	For	example,	one	used	a	bunny	that	became	a	carrot	when	turned	inside	
out.	This	object	was	put,	as	a	carrot,	into	box	1	in	the	presence	of	the	protagonist.	In	the	
second	step,	the	protagonist	was	absent	while	the	object	was	taken	out	of	the	box,	turned	
inside	out	so	that	it	became	a	bunny,	and	put	back	into	Box	1	as	a	bunny.	In	the	final	step,	
the	protagonist	returns	and	observes	the	object	being	moved,	as	a	bunny,	from	Box	1	to	Box	
2.	The	test	question	was,	“Where	will	the	protagonist	look	for	the	carrot?”		To	answer	this	
question	correctly	(“in	Box	1”),	the	child	has	to	take	into	account	aspectuality.	This	is	
because	the	protagonist,	being	unaware	that	the	bunny	is	the	carrot,	believes	that	the	
bunny	is	in	Box	2	and	that	the	carrot	is	in	Box	1.		Four-year-olds	succeeded	on	this	
aspectuality	false	belief	task.	Further,	there	were	strong	correlations	between	aspectuality	
and	standard	FB	tasks	(Rakoczy	et	al.,	2015).	This	recent	evidence	thus	speaks	strongly	in	
favor	of	convergence	in	performance	on	explicit	FB	tasks	and	unity	in	the	underlying	
competence.	
What	about	unity	of	performance	in	implicit	FB	tasks?	A	number	of	recent	studies	do	
initially	appear	to	suggest	that	infants	and	toddlers	can	solve	some	implicit	FB	tasks	
requiring	an	understanding	of	aspectuality	(F.	Buttelmann,	Suhrke,	&	Buttelmann,	2015;	
Scott	&	Baillargeon,	2009;	Scott,	Richman,	&	Baillargeon,	2015).	However,	all	of	these	
studies	have	used	a	single	isolated	situation	or	vignette,	each	of	which	leaves	room	for	
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alternative,	more	parsimonious	explanations.1	Even	more	fundamentally,	it	hard	to	interpret	
these	findings	given	that	the	scenarios	they	rely	on	have	neither	been	used	nor	validated	in	
explicit	tasks	with	older	children	or	adults.	(For	preliminary	evidence	that	adults	in	fact	do	
not	view	the	scenarios	of	Scott	&	Baillargeon	(2009)	as	the	task	analysis	assumes	they	
should,	see	Low	et	al.,	unpublished	data.)		It	thus	remains	unclear	whether	these	implicit	
tasks	really	do	tap	the	same	representational	processes	as	explicit	tasks.	Such	doubt	
receives	support	from	recent	findings	that	performance	on	different	types	of	implicit	ToM	
tasks	does	not	show	the	unity	and	convergence	characteristic	of	performance	on	explicit	
tasks	(Yott	&	Poulin-Dubois,	2016).		
A	more	direct	test	of	two-systems	accounts	therefore	requires	direct	comparison	of	
implicit	and	explicit	tasks,	ideally	using	a	single	scenario.		Low	and	colleagues	have	done	just	
this	in	a	series	of	studies.		For	the	explicit	tasks,	their	results	indicate	that	competence	in	
standard	change-of-location	scenarios	converges	with	competence	in	modified	scenarios	
that	involve	aspectuality	(Low,	Drummond,	Walmsley,	&	Wang,	2014;	Low	&	Watts,	2013):	
3-year-olds	consistently	failed	both	non-aspectual	and	aspectual	versions	of	explicit	FB	
tasks,	whereas	4-year-olds	and	adults	consistently	mastered	both	types	of	task.	By	contrast,	
in	implicit	versions	of	the	tasks,	all	age	groups	showed	signs	of	tracking	the	agent’s	belief	in	
the	standard	(non-aspectual)	FB	task,	but	not	in	the	aspectual	FB	task.		This	suggests	there	
are	signature	limits	in	early	implicit	ToM,	as	predicted	by	the	two-systems	account.			
This	interpretation	of	the	findings	in	terms	of	signature	limits	has	recently	been	
subject	to	some	debate,	however	(Carruthers,	2013;	Csibra,	2012;	Jacob,	2012).	Defenders	
																																								 																				
1	For	arguments	that	the	tasks	used	by	Scott	&	Baillargeon	(2009)	and	Scott,	Richman	&	Baillargeon	(2015)	do	
not	clearly	require	understanding	aspectuality,	see	Butterfill	&	Apperly	(2013)	and	Low,	Apperly,	Butterfill	&	
Rakoczy	(2016).		A	specific	worry	concerning	Buttelmann	et	al.	(2015)	is	that	it	is	not	about	children’s	
understanding	of	beliefs	regarding	aspectuality	at	all,	but	rather	about	their	understanding	of	reality	vs.	
appearance,	and	it	is	not	clear	whether	such	tasks	require	an	understanding	of	aspectuality	at	all.		In	addition,	
the	effects	in	this	study	were	small	and	basically	restricted	to	one	out	of	four	sets	of	stimuli.		
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of	early	competence	accounts	have	worried	whether	the	different	results	in	the	aspectual	
FB	and	the	standard	FB	tasks	may	have	been	due	to	different	working	memory	demands	or	
other	performance	factors	(perhaps	because	only	the	aspectual	FB	task	involves	certain	
forms	of	mental	rotation	and	simulation).		Furthermore,	these	findings	of	disunity	are	so	far	
restricted	to	looking	behavior.	It	is	thus	unclear	whether	such	performance	patterns	also	
translate	into	more	active	behavior.	
	
Rationale	of	the	present	study	
In	the	present	study	we	intended	to	test	whether	there	are	signature	limits	in	early	
ToM	capacities.	Going	beyond	mere	looking	behavior,	we	investigated	children’s	
spontaneous	interactive	behavior	towards	a	protagonist.	To	directly	investigate	whether	
disunity	in	early	ToM	performance	in	various	implicit	tasks	contrasts	with	unity	in	later	
explicit	performance,	we	used	the	very	same	kind	of	materials	and	scenarios	with	which	
recent	evidence	for	convergence	and	unity	in	explicit	FB	tasks	was	found	(Rakoczy	et	al.,	
2015).	In	our	non-aspectual,	change-of-location	conditions,	children	saw	scenarios	in	which	
a	protagonist	had	a	true	belief	(TB),	or	false	belief	(FB),	about	an	object’s	location	(following	
D.	Buttelmann	et	al.,	2009).		In	our	novel,	aspectual	conditions,	the	protagonist	did	(TB),	or	
did	not	(FB),	know	about	the	dual	aspects	of	an	object.	The	crucial	difference	between	the	
non-aspectual	and	aspectual	conditions	of	our	helping	task	is	thus	whether	they	require	
tracking	beliefs	essentially	involving	aspectuality.		Accordingly,	the	distinctive	predictions	of	
the	two-systems	account	are,	first,	that	children’s	spontaneous	interactive	responses	should	
differ	appropriately	between	the	TB	and	FB	non-aspectual	conditions;	and,	second,	that	
there	should	be	no	such	difference	between	TB	and	FB	aspectual	conditions.	
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Experiment	1	
Method2	
Participants.	 67	 children	 (26	 females)	 were	 included	 in	 the	 final	 sample.	 The	
children’s	mean	age	was	31	months	(SD	=	2.66;	range	=	26-36).	9	additional	children	were	
not	included	in	the	analysis	because	they	were	uncooperative	(N	=	8)	or	due	to	experimental	
error	(N	=	1).		
Design.	Children	were	randomly	assigned	to	one	of	 four	conditions:	non-aspectual,	
change-of-location	 false	 belief	 (Loc_FB),	 non-aspectual,	 change-of-location	 true	 belief	
(Loc_TB),	 aspectual	 false	 belief	 (Asp_FB)	 and	 aspectual	 true	 belief	 (Asp_TB).	 Each	 child	
received	two	(in	two	exceptional	cases	three,	as	explained	in	the	Supplementary	Materials)	
trials	in	one	of	the	conditions.				
Materials.	 In	 the	non-aspectual	 task,	one	toy	object	 (a	ball,	a	soft	 toy	rabbit,	a	 toy	
dog	or	toy	donkey)	per	trial	and	two	boxes	were	used.	In	the	aspectual	task,	one	reversible	
soft	 toy	(a	bear,	bunny,	 tiger,	pig),	which	could	be	turned	 inside	out	through	a	zipper	and	
transformed	(into	a	honey	barrel,	a	carrot,	a	snail	and	a	cake,	respectively,	see	Figure	1),	and	
one	 box	 were	 used	 per	 trial.	 Boxes	 were	 covered	 with	 a	 tissue	 on	 the	 inside	 to	 leave	
children	ignorant	about	their	(empty)	contents.	A	puppet	called	Susi	(animated	by	E2)	was	
used	as	protagonist.		
	
																																								 																				
2	For	full	details	concerning	the	method	of	both	studies,	and	for	complementary	results	and	analyses,	see	the	
Supplementary	Material.	
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Figure	1.Examples	of	the	stimuli	used	in	the	aspectual	false	belief	task.	
	
Procedure.	 Each	 child	 was	 tested	 in	 an	 interactive	 play	 setting	 with	 two	
experimenters.	 A	 parent	 was	 present	 during	 the	 session.	 After	 two	 warm-up	 trials	 (see	
Supplementary	Material	for	details),	children	standardly	received	two	trials	of	the	condition	
they	were	randomly	assigned	to.	In	exceptional	cases,	a	third	trial	was	administered.		
(1)	Non-aspectual,	 change-of-location	 tasks.	The	basic	 sequence	of	events	 in	 these	
tasks,	modeled	on	Buttelmann	et	al.	(2009),	was	the	following:	There	were	two	boxes.	These	
were	 difficult	 to	 open,	 and	 the	 child	 learned	 how	 to	 open	 them.	 	 The	 protagonist,	 Susi,	
received	 a	 toy	 and	 expressed	 a	 liking	 for	 it.	 Susi	 then	 announced	 that	 she	 had	 forgotten	
something	and	had	to	leave,	and	that	she	would	leave	the	toy	in	box	1	during	her	absence.	
She	did	so	with	the	help	of	E1	(because	she	was	unable	to	open	the	box	on	her	own).	The	
following	sequence	varied	between	conditions	(see	Fig.	2	and	Supplementary	Material):		
  Loc_FB	condition:	Susi	left.	In	Susi’s	absence,	E1	proposed	playing	a	trick	on	Susi.	E1	
took	the	toy	out	of	the	box	and	sneakily	placed	it	in	the	other	box.			
  Loc_TB	condition:	Susi	left,	and	returned	a	few	seconds	later.	In	Susi’s	presence,	E1	
took	 the	 toy	out	of	 the	box	and	placed	 it	 in	 the	other	box,	 saying:	“Look,	Susi	and	
[child’s	name]!”	 and	alternating	gaze	between	 the	 child	 and	E2.	 Susi	 observed	 the	
location	change	closely,	saying:	“Ah,	I	see!	Yes!”		
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After	 her	 return	 (in	 the	 Loc_FB	 condition),	 or	 after	 the	 observed	 location	 change	 (in	 the	
Loc_TB	condition),	Susi	tried	to	open	the	box	where	her	toy	was	formerly	located.	Susi	failed	
to	open	the	box,	and	showed	disappointment.	We	call	this	event	the	signal	in	what	follows.	
If	 the	 child	 did	 not	 react	 spontaneously,	 Susi	 asked	 “Can	 you	 help	me?”.	 If	 the	 child	 still	
showed	 no	 reaction,	 E1	 prompted	 the	 child	 to	 help.	 If	 the	 child	 still	 refused,	 E1	 asked	
“Should	we	help	her	together?”,	but	didn’t	move	and	waited	to	see	where	the	child	would	
go.	 Children’s	 reactions	 to	 the	 signal	 were	 coded.	 The	 task	 was	 repeated	 with	 different	
boxes	and	a	different	target	toy.	
(2)	Aspectual	task.	Children	were	first	 familiarized	with	the	dual	aspectuality	of	the	
target	objects.	To	this	end,	Susi	(the	protagonist)	left	the	room	and	E1	showed	the	first	soft	
toy	 to	 the	 child.	 Then	 she	 sneakily	 transformed	 it	 to	 its	 other	 aspect	 saying:	 “Look!	 The	
bunny	 is	 also	 a	 carrot!”	 (for	 example).	 E1	 reminded	 the	 child,	 “Susi	 does	 not	 know	 that,	
right?”.	The	child	was	then	asked,	“Can	you	make	it	so	that	it	is	a	bunny	again?”.	If	the	child	
was	unable	or	unwilling,	E1	helped.	This	was	repeated	with	a	second	object,	which	was	later	
used	for	the	second	test	trial.		
Following	 familiarization,	 Susi	 returned	 for	 the	 test	 trials.	 As	 in	 non-aspectual	
conditions,	there	were	two	boxes.	These	were	difficult	to	open,	but	the	child	learned	how	to	
open	 them.	 	 Susi	 received	 the	 first	 soft	 toy	 and	 expressed	 her	 liking	 of	 it.	 Susi	 then	
announced	 that	 she	had	 forgotten	 something,	 and	 that	 she	would	 leave	 the	 toy	 in	 box	 1	
during	her	absence.	She	did	so	with	the	help	of	E1	(because	she	was	unable	to	open	the	box	
on	 her	 own).	 The	 following	 sequence	 varied	 between	 conditions	 (see	 Fig.	 2	 and	
Supplementary	Material):			
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  Asp_FB	condition:	Susi	left.	In	Susi’s	absence,	E1	proposed	playing	a	trick	on	Susi.	E1	
took	the	toy	out	of	box	1.	E1	transformed	it	(e.g.	a	carrot)	while	giggling,	gesturing	
and	whispering	“Shh”.	E1	then	returned	it	into	the	box.		
  Asp_TB	condition:	Susi	left,	and	returned	a	few	seconds	later.	In	Susi’s	presence,	E1	
took	 the	 toy	out	 of	 box	 1	 and	 transformed	 it	while	 saying:	 “Look	 Susi	 and	 [child’s	
name]!”	and	alternating	gaze	between	the	child	and	E2.		E1	then	put	it	back	into	the	
box.	Susi	observed	this	event	closely,	saying:	“Ah,	I	see!	Yes!”		
After	 her	 return	 (in	 the	 Asp_FB	 condition),	 or	 after	 the	 observed	 aspect	 change	 (in	 the	
Asp_TB	condition),	Susi	moved	back	to	her	original	position.	E1	said,	“Look	Susi	and	[child’s	
name]!”	 before	 taking	 the	 transformed	 toy	 (e.g.	 carrot)	 out	 of	 the	 box	 and	 placing	 it	
approximately	1m	away	from	box	1	at	a	point	equidistant	between	Susi	and	the	child.	After	
observing	this	closely,	Susi	then	tried	to	open	box	1.	Susi	failed	to	open	the	box,	and	showed	
disappointment.	This	signal	and	the	following	events	were	the	same	as	in	the	non-aspectual,	
change-of-location	 tasks.	 The	 task	 was	 repeated	 with	 a	 different	 box	 and	 a	 different	
reversible	toy.	
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Figure	2.	Schematic	event	sequences	of	the	non-aspectual	and	aspectual	tasks	in	Exp.	1.	
	
	
Coding.	Sessions	were	coded	from	video	by	one	coder.	The	child’s	 first	reaction	to	the	
signal	(her	failed	attempt	to	open	a	box)	was	coded.	The	coder	categorized	this	reaction	as:		
  open	box	1:	 the	child	clearly	 referred	 to	box	1,	either	by	approaching	 the	box	and	
opening	 it	 successfully,	 or	 else	 by	 trying	 unsuccessfully	 to	 open	 it	 (e.g.	 pulling	 the	
elastic	band).			
  open	box	2	(in	the	non-aspectual	task	only):	the	child	clearly	referred	to	box	2,	either	
by	approaching	the	box	and	opening	it	successfully,	or	else	by	trying	unsuccessfully	
to	open	it		
  give	the	object	to	Susi	(in	the	aspectual	task	only):	the	child	handed	the	toy	Susi.	
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  ambiguous:	the	child	showed	a	behavior	that	was	clearly	a	reaction	to	the	signal,	but	
which	did	not	fit	any	the	above	categories.	
  invalid:	a	parent	interfered;	the	child	did	not	show	any	reaction	at	all;	the	child	left	
the	scene	during	the	trial	or	did	not	pay	attention	to	the	event	sequence;	or	the	child	
could	not	be	held	back	from	reacting	too	early.	
A	 second	coder,	who	was	blind	 for	 the	experimental	 condition	and	hypotheses,	 coded	14	
randomly	selected	videos	(a	20%	sample).	The	second	coder	agreed	with	the	original	coder	
on	all	trials	(к	=	1.00).	
	
Predictions.	 In	 the	 Loc_FB	 condition,	 a	 child	 tracking	 Susi’s	 false	 belief	may	 recognize	
that	Susi	is	opening	box	1	because	she	believes,	falsely,	that	her	toy	is	in	box	1.	This	would	
give	the	child	a	reason	to	respond	by	opening	box	2,	which	actually	contains	Susi’s	toy.	The	
child	 has	 no	 comparable	 reason	 for	 opening	 box	 2	 in	 the	 Loc_TB	 condition.	 Accordingly,	
children	 who	 track	 Susi’s	 false	 belief	 should	 open	 box	 1	 more	 often	 in	 Loc_TB	 than	 in	
Loc_FB.	(Of	course,	it	is	not	wrong	for	the	child	to	respond	by	opening	box	1	in	Loc_FB.	After	
all,	the	child	may	reason	that	the	best	way	to	help	Susi	 is	to	assist	with	her	proximal	goal,	
which	is	to	open	box	1.)		Similar	reasoning	suggests	that	children	who	track	Susi’s	belief	in	
the	aspectual	conditions	should	open	box	1	more	often	in	Asp_TB	than	in	Asp_FB.	
Recall	 that	 the	 two-systems	 account	 predicts	 that	 two-year-olds	 can	 track	 some	 false	
beliefs	about	 location	but	cannot	track	 false	beliefs	essentially	 involving	aspectuality.	 	The	
pattern	of	results	predicted	by	the	two-systems	account	is	therefore	the	following:	children	
should	open	box	1	more	often	in	Loc_TB	than	Loc_FB,	but	should	not	open	box	1	more	often	
in	Asp_TB	than	Asp_FB.		
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Results	
All	 in	 all,	 64	 children	 (32	 each	 in	 the	 non-aspectual	 and	 aspectual	 conditions)	
received	at	 least	one	valid	 (including	ambiguous)	 trial.	For	each	of	 these	children,	at	 least	
one	 trial	 was	 also	 unambiguous.	 (For	 details	 concerning	 more	 comprehensive	 analyses	
involving	invalid	and	ambiguous	trials,	see	Supplementary	Material.)	For	the	main	analysis,	
the	 first	 valid	 and	 unambiguous	 trial	 was	 used.	 When	 possible,	 one-tailed	 tests	 were	
conducted	whenever	directed	a	priori	hypotheses	were	tested	(such	that	children	perform	
more	often	“open	box	1”	in	contrast	to	“open	box	2/give	object”	behavior	in	the	TB	than	in	
the	 FB	 conditions).	 Figure	 3	 depicts	 children’s	 helping	 behavior	 in	 the	 first	 valid	 and	
unambiguous	 trial.	 In	 non-aspectual	 conditions,	 children’s	 helping	 behavior	 differed	
significantly	between	Loc_FB	and	Loc_TB	conditions	(p	=	.037,	one-tailed	Fisher’s	exact	test).	
In	 the	 aspectual	 tasks,	 in	 contrast,	 helping	 behavior	 did	 not	 differ	 significantly	 between	
Asp_FB	and	Asp_TB	conditions	(p	=	.166,	one-tailed	Fisher’s	exact	test).		
	
	a	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 	 	 (a)		 	 	 	 	 	 (b)	
	
Figure	 3.	 Number	 of	 children	 showing	 the	 different	 kinds	 of	 helping	 behavior	 in	 the	 first	 valid	 and	
unambiguous	trial	of	(a)	the	non-aspectual	tasks,	(b)	the	aspectual	tasks.	[*p	<	.05]	
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Complementary	 analysis.	When	 comparing	 the	 non-aspectual	 and	 aspectual	 tasks	
for	FB	and	TB,	respectively,	results	revealed	that	children	tended	to	perform	differently	 in	
the	non-aspectual	than	in	the	aspectual	FB	tasks	(opening	box	1	less	often	in	Loc_FB	than	in	
Asp_FB,	p	=	.037,	one-tailed	Fisher’s	exact	test).	No	differences	were	found	for	the	two	TB	
tasks,	Loc_TB	and	Asp_TB	(p	=	.166).	
	
Discussion	
	 The	results	of	the	non-aspectual	task	in	the	present	experiment	replicate	the	general	
finding	 by	 Buttelmann	 et	 al.	 (2009)	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 toddlers	 responded	 differentially	 in	
Loc_FB	 and	 Loc_TB	 tasks.	 Performance	 differed	 on	 the	 novel,	 aspectual	 tasks	 which	 we	
developed	to	test	the	predictions	of	the	two-systems	theory.	Children’s	helping	behavior	did	
not	differ	significantly	between	Asp_TB	and	Asp_FB	conditions.		
	 What	does	 this	pattern	show?	 	One	possibility	 is	 that	our	 results	do	 indeed	 reflect	
the	 characteristic	 signature	 limits	 in	 children’s	 early	 ToM	 abilities	 predicted	 by	 the	 two-
systems	 account	 (Butterfill	 &	 Apperly,	 2013).	 We	 will	 turn	 to	 that	 explanation,	 and	 to	
alternatives,	in	the	General	Discussion.		Another	possibility,	however,	is	that	the	difference	
in	performance	reflects	the	influence	of	different	performance	factors	and	tasks	demands.	
Our	aspectual	task	might	have	imposed	higher	working	memory	demands	since	children	had	
to	keep	in	mind	the	two	aspects	of	an	object	and	Susi’s	visual	access	these.		By	contrast,	the	
non-aspectual	task	involved	just	one	object	and	just	one	aspect.	In	light	of	this	extraneous	
difference,	 it	 may	 be	 argued	 that	 our	 novel	 aspectual	 tasks	 simply	 failed	 to	 uncover	
children’s	 existing	 competence.	 This	 objection	 is	 particularly	 pressing	 given	 our	 relatively	
small	sample	size	and	thus	power.	A	further	potential	objection	 is	that	we	gave	children	a	
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warm-up	 trial	 in	 which	 Susi	 went	 from	 being	 knowledgeable	 to	 ignorant	 concerning	 the	
location	of	a	 toy	 (as	described	 in	 the	Supplementary	Material).	This	might	have	 facilitated	
performance	in	the	non-aspectual	task	change	task	only.			
Differences	between	our	aspectual	and	non-aspectual	tasks	thus	reveal	the	need	for	
replication	 of	 our	 findings.	 The	 replication	 should	 use	 a	more	 stringent,	minimal	 contrast	
design	 in	which	 all	 but	 the	 crucial	 aspects	 (the	 content	 of	 the	 belief	 to	 be	 ascribed,	 and	
whether	 it	 is	 true	 or	 false)	 are	 kept	 as	 constant	 as	 possible	 across	 tasks.	 Experiment	 2	
therefore	 investigated	 possible	 signature	 limits	 in	 early	 belief	 understanding	 with	
thoroughly	 matched	 non-aspectual	 and	 aspectual	 tasks,	 and	 with	 larger	 sample	 size	
intended	to	ensure	sufficient	power.	
Experiment	2	
	 In	 order	 to	 match	 the	 aspectuality	 and	 non-aspectual	 tasks	 more	 closely,	 new	
versions	of	these	tasks	with	comparable	performance	demands	were	devised.	The	warm-up	
trials	were	modified	to	minimize	the	risk	of	priming	children	for	a	change-of-location	false	
belief	task.	To	equate	working	memory	load	as	far	as	possible,	the	new	version	of	the	non-
aspectual	task	involved	two	objects	rather	than	one.	To	reduce	the	number	of	trials	coded	
“invalid”	and	“ambiguous”,	the	experimental	setting	was	changed.	Children	sat	on	the	lap	of	
a	parent	at	the	table.	A	younger	age	group	was	investigated,	which	we	hoped	would	mean	
fewer	children	would	do	things	like	run	away	or	turn	around	during	testing.		
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Method	
Participants.	137	children	(61	females)	were	included	in	the	final	sample3.	Children’s	
mean	age	was	26	months	 (SD	=	1.92;	range	=	24-30).	Five	additional	children	were	tested	
but	not	included	in	the	analysis	because	they	were	uncooperative.	
Design.	As	in	Exp.	1,	children	were	randomly	assigned	to	one	of	four	conditions:	non-
aspectual,	 change-of-location	 false	 belief	 (Loc_FB),	 non-aspectual,	 change-of-location	 true	
belief	(Loc_TB),	aspectual	false	belief	(Asp_FB)	and	aspectual	true	belief	(Asp_TB).	Each	child	
received	two	(in	two	exceptional	cases	three,	as	explained	in	the	Supplementary	Materials)	
trials	in	one	of	the	conditions.	(Two	short	additional	tasks	were	administered	during	warm-
up	and	at	the	end	of	the	session.	As	these	focused	on	another	research	question,	they	are	
not	reported	here.)	
Materials.	We	used	materials	similar	to	those	used	in	Exp.	1.	For	Exp.	2,	we	used	a	
larger	box	was	with	more	openings	to	allow	more	ways	of	searching	in	it	(see	Fig.	4).	Also,	in	
Exp.	2	we	did	not	use	the	puppet,	Susi.	Instead	E2	herself	played	the	role	of	the	protagonist.	
This	because	we	were	concerned	that	Susi	might	frighten	younger	children.	
.	 	
Figure	4.	Example	of	the	boxes	used	in	Exp.	2.	
																																								 																				
3	We	reasoned	that	a	significantly	bigger	sample	in	Experiment	1	would	be	appropriate	because	the	tasks	used	
in	Experiment	2	may	be	more	demanding,	potentially	making	competence	harder	to	detect	and	effect	sizes	
smaller.		
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Procedure.	We	followed	the	same	procedure	used	in	Exp.	1	except	for	the	warm-up	
trials	(which	are	detailed	in	the	Supplementary	Material).	
	(1)	 Non-aspectual,	 change-of-location	 tasks.	 The	 basic	 sequence	 of	 events	 in	 these	
tasks,	 adapted	 from	Buttelmann	 et	 al.	 (2009),	was	 the	 following:	 E2	 found	 two	 toys,	 and	
expressed	a	liking	for	them.	She	then	announced	that	she	had	forgotten	something	and	had	
to	 leave,	 and	 that	 she	would	 leave	 the	 toys	 in	 the	box	during	her	absence.	 The	 following	
sequence	varied	between	conditions	(see	Fig.	5	and	Supplementary	Material):		
  Loc_FB	condition:	E2	left,	and	E1	reappeared	from	behind	some	curtains.	E1	greeted	
the	child	and	proposed	playing	a	trick	on	E2.	To	this	end,	E1	took	one	of	the	toys	out	
of	the	box	and	sneakily	hid	it	under	a	tissue.		
  Loc_TB	 condition:	 E1	appeared	 from	behind	 the	 curtains,	 telling	 E2	 she	wanted	 to	
show	her	something	before	E2	left.		As	in	Loc_FB,	E1	then	took	one	of	the	toys	out	of	
the	 box	 and	 hit	 it	 under	 a	 tissue.	 The	 only	 difference	 was	 that	 E1’s	 actions	 were	
manifestly	witnessed	by	E2,	who	did	not	leave	the	room.	After	E1	had	hid	the	toy,	E2	
told	the	child	she	now	really	had	to	leave	and	left	the	room	for	several	seconds.		
Upon	her	 return	 (in	both	 conditions),	 E2	approached	 the	 table	 and	 reached	 into	 the	box.		
She	took	out	the	remaining	object	and	put	it	beside	the	box.	She	then	began	to	search	in	the	
box	again,	saying	“Hmm,	Eh?	I	don’t	understand…	but	where	is….”.	As	in	Exp.	1,	this	event	is	
referred	to	as	the	signal.	If	the	child	did	not	react	to	the	signal	spontaneously,	E2	sat	down	
and	 expressed	 disappointment,	 saying	 “Hm.	Oh	 no!”.	 If	 the	 child	 did	 not	 react,	 E2	 asked	
“Can	you	help	me?”.	The	task	was	repeated	with	a	different	box	and	two	different	toys.		
	
Signature	limits	in	early	theory	of	mind								21		
	
	
	
Figure	5.	Schematic	event	sequences	of	the	location	and	aspectual		FB/TB	tasks	in	Exp..	2.		
	
(2)	Aspectual	task.	The	procedure	for	the	aspectual	task	was	exactly	as	for	the	non-
aspectual	 task,	 except	 for	 the	 following	 differences:	When	 E1	 appeared	 from	 behind	 the	
curtains	 for	 the	 first	 time,	 she	 introduced	 only	 one	 reversible	 toy	 to	 the	 child.	 She	 then	
transformed	 it	 into	 its	 other	 aspect,	 saying	 “Look!	 The	 bunny	 is	 also	 an	 carrot!”	 (for	
example).	In	Asp_FB,	she	did	this	in	a	sneaky	way,	whispering	“Shh”	and	telling	the	child	“’E2	
does	not	know	that,	right?”.	The	child	was	then	asked,	“Can	you	make	it	so	that	it	is	a	bunny	
again?”	(and	was	helped	by	E1	if	unwilling	or	unable).	E1	then	placed	the	toy	in	its	original	
aspect	(e.g.	bunny)	on	the	table	and	returned	to	her	place	behind	the	curtains.	After	this,	E2	
came,	found	the	toy,	expressed	her	liking	for	it	and	put	it	into	the	box	before	leaving	again.		
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Then,	either	in	the	absence	(Asp_FB),	or	in	the	presence	(Asp_TB),	of	E2,	and	in	exactly	the	
same	sneaky	or	not	sneaky	way	as	in	the	non-aspectual	tasks,	E1	appeared	from	behind	the	
curtains,	took	the	toy	out	of	the	box,	transformed	it	into	its	second	aspect	(e.g.	carrot),	and	
put	it	back	into	the	box.		When	E2	reentered	the	room	she	reached	into	the	box,	took	out	
the	toy	in	its	second,	carrot	aspect,	put	it	aside	and	began	to	search	again.	E2	did	all	in	this	
in	the	same	manner	she	in	which	she	acted	in	the	non-aspectual	tasks.	
Coding.	 As	 in	 Exp.	 1,	 the	 child’s	 first	 reaction	 to	 the	 signal	 was	 coded.	 The	 coder	
categorized	this	reaction	as:	
  help	to	search	in	the	box:	the	child	touched	the	box,	pulled	a	grip,	opened	one	of	the	
doors,	or	tried	to	look	inside.	
  give	the	object:		the	child	took	the	object,	either	from	under	the	tissue	(in	the	non-
aspectual	 tasks)	 or	 else	 from	 on	 the	 table	 (in	 the	 aspectual	 tasks);	 or	 the	 child	
pointed	to	the	object.	
  ambiguous:	the	child	showed	a	behavior	that	was	clearly	a	reaction	to	the	signal,	but	
which	did	not	fit	any	the	above	categories.	
  invalid:	a	parent	interfered;	the	child	did	not	show	any	reaction	at	all;	the	child	left	
the	scene	during	the	trial	or	did	not	pay	attention	to	the	event	sequence;	or	the	child	
could	not	be	held	back	from	reacting	too	early.	
A	 third	 coder,	 who	 was	 blind	 to	 the	 experimental	 condition	 and	 hypotheses,	 coded	 27	
randomly	selected	tapes	(36	trials,	a	20%	sample).	This	coder	agreed	with	the	original	coder	
on	nearly	all	trials	(к	=	.96).	
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Results		
All	 in	all,	109	children	 (51	 in	 the	non-aspectual	and	58	 in	 the	aspectual	conditions)	
received	at	least	one	valid	(including	ambiguous)	trial.	Of	these	children,	48	children	had	at	
least	 one	 valid	 and	 unambiguous	 trial	 per	 type	 of	 condition.	 (For	 details	 regarding	 the	
distribution	of	 all	 trials,	 including	 invalid	ones,	 see	Supplementary	Material.)	As	 in	 Exp.	 1,		
the	 first	 valid	 and	unambiguous	 trial	was	used	 for	 the	main	 analysis	 (see	 Figure	6;	 for	 an	
analysis	 including	 ambiguous	 trials,	 see	 Supplementary	 Material).	 In	 non-aspectual	
conditions,	 children’s	 helping	 behavior	 differed	 significantly	 between	 Loc_FB	 and	 Loc_TB	
conditions	(N	=	48,	p	=	 .018,	one-tailed	Fisher’s	exact	test).	 In	the	aspectual	tasks,	helping	
behavior	 did	 not	 differ	 significantly	 between	 Asp_FB	 and	 Asp_TB	 conditions	 (N	 =	 48,	p	 =	
.207,	one-tailed	Fisher’s	exact	test).		
Complementary	 analysis.	 Comparing	 the	 Loc_TB	 and	 Loc_FB	 conditions	 revealed	
that	children	tended	open	the	box	more	often	in	Loc_TB	than	in	the	Asp_TB,	(p	=	.049,	one-
tailed	Fisher’s	exact	test).	No	differences	were	between	Loc_FB	and	Asp_FB	(p	=	.379,	one-
tailed	Fisher’s	exact	test).	
	
Signature	limits	in	early	theory	of	mind								24		
	
	
	 	 	 (a)		 	 	 	 	 	 (b)	
Figure	 6.	 Number	 of	 children	 showing	 the	 different	 kinds	 of	 helping	 behavior	 in	 the	 first	 valid	 and	
unambiguous	trial	(a)	the	non-aspectual	tasks,	(b)	the	aspectual	tasks.	[*p	<	.05]	
	
	
Discussion	
In	Exp.	2	we	aimed	to	 test	 for	 the	patterns	of	 results	 found	 in	Exp.	1	with	more	stringent	
contrasts.	 	To	 this	end,	 the	non-aspectual	and	aspectual	 tasks	were	matched	as	closely	as	
possible	in	terms	of	irrelevant	performance	factors.		The	results	largely	converge	with	those	
of	Exp.	1.	Children’s	helping	behaviour	differed	between	the	two	non-aspectual	conditions,	
Loc_FB	and	Loc_TB;	but	did	not	differ	bewteen	 the	 two	aspectual	conditions,	Asp_TB	and	
Asp_FB.	 	
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General	Discussion	
Summary	and	limitations	of	the	present	studies	
Two	 experiments	 tested	 for	 signature	 limits	 in	 the	 toddlers’	 early	 understanding	 of	 false	
belief	 as	 indicated	 in	 their	 active	 helping	 behavior.	 Both	 experiments	 found,	 in	 line	 with	
previous	work,	 that	children’s	helping	behavior	differed	between	a	condition	 in	which	the	
protagonist	 had	 a	 true	 belief	 and	 a	 condition	 in	 which	 she	 had	 a	 false	 belief	 about	 the	
location	of	 an	object.	However,	 in	parallel	 aspectual	 tasks	 in	which	 the	protagonist	had	a	
true	 or	 false	 belief	 essentially	 involving	 aspectuality,	 toddlers’	 helping	 behavior	 did	 not	
differ	 significantly	 between	 true	 and	 false	 belief	 conditions.	 Experiment	 2	 controlled	 for	
differences	 in	 inferential	 complexity	 between	 the	 tasks	 in	 terms	 of	working	memory	 and	
other	performance	factors,	replicating	the	basic	results	of	Experiment	1.	
It	 should	 be	 noted,	 however,	 that	 these	 findings	 are	 not	 particularly	 strong	 or	
unambiguous.	 	 It	 is	true	that	a	key	prediction	of	the	two-systems	account	was	born	out	 in	
the	 difference	 between	 performance	 on	 non-aspectuality,	 change-of-location	 tasks	 and	
performance	 on	 aspectual	 tasks,	 opposing	 accounts	 cannot	 be	 entirely	 ruled	 out	 by	 our	
findings.	But	when	comparing	performance	on	just	the	aspectuality	and	non-aspectuality	FB	
tasks,	we	found	a	difference	in	Experiment	1	only.	While	the	two-systems	account	does	not	
directly	generate	a	prediction	concerning	this	comparison,	we	would	be	more	confident	in	
our	 findings	 if	we	had	 found	a	difference	on	 just	 the	aspectuality	and	non-aspectuality	FB	
tasks	in	both	experiments.	Clearly,	more	comprehensive,	systematic	and	sensitive	tests	for	
such	potential	patterns	of	contrast	between	aspectual	and	non-aspectual	FB/TB	tasks	will	be	
needed	in	future	research.	
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Furthermore,	while	we	attempted	to	match	the	non-aspectual	and	aspectual	tasks	as	
carefully	 matched	 as	 possible,	 some	 differences	 do	 remain.	 One	 such	 difference	 may	
complicate	the	interpretation	of	our	findings.	Consider	the	range	of	appropriate	behaviours	
in	each	FB	task.	In	neither	the	non-aspectuality	FB	task	nor	the	aspectuality	FB	task	is	there	
a	single	correct	response.	When	the	protagonist	asks	for	help,	it	is	not	incorrect	to	help	her	
with	what	is	certainly	her	proximal	goal	(opening	this	box)	rather	than	with	what	is	plausibly	
her	more	distal	 goal	 (getting	her	 toy).	But	 for	methodological	 reasons,	our	 tasks	 focus	on	
trials	 where	 children	 help	 the	 protagonist	 with	 her	 more	 distal	 goal.	 And	 helping	 the	
protagonist	with	her	more	distal	goal	may	be	more	demanding	on	our	aspectuality	FB	task	
than	on	our	non-aspectuality	FB	task.	On	the	aspectuality	FB	task,	helping	the	protagonist	
with	getting	her	toy	would	ideally	involve	not	only	giving	the	toy	to	the	protagonist	but	also	
pointing	out,	by	communication	or	by	turning	it	inside	out,	the	hidden	aspect	under	which	
the	protagonist	is	actually	looking	for	the	object.	If	children	appreciated	that	helping	would	
ideally	 involve	 this,	 the	 complexity	 of	 the	 aspectual	 FB	 condition	might	 in	 principle	 have	
simply	 overwhelmed	 and	 paralyzed	 children.	 	 While	 we	 cannot	 rule	 out	 this	 possibility	
altogether,	we	think	it	unlikely.	This	 is	 in	part	because	children	did	not	need	to	show	such	
complex	 responses:	 they	 could	 succeed	merely	by	pointing	 to,	 or	 giving,	 the	 toy,	without	
any	further	communicative	attempt.		Further,	in	another	recent	study	with	analogous	design	
but	 in	which	 the	 aspectuality	was	 not	 realized	 by	 revertible	 objects	with	 hidden	 aspects,	
children	 showed	 qualitatively	 the	 very	 same	 pattern	 of	 responses	 (Oktay-Gür,	 Schulz,	 &	
Rakoczy,	2017).	
What	do	the	results	show?		
Keeping	 in	mind	 their	 limitations,	what	do	 the	present	 findings	 show?	On	 the	one	
hand,	children’s	performance	might	reflect	the	true	limits	of	their	ToM	capacities.	The	limits	
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observed	 here	 are	 the	 very	 signature	 limits	 in	 early	 mindreading	 predicted	 by	 the	 two-
system	account	(Apperly	&	Butterfill,	2009;	Butterfill	&	Apperly,	2013).	On	this	account,	an	
early-developing	 system	 is	 assumed	 to	 enable	 a	 person	 to	 solve	 some	ToM	 tasks	 but	 not	
others.	Limits	on	which	tasks	such	a	system	could	solve	follow	from	conjectures	about	the	
kind	of	mental	state	that	they	represent.	In	the	case	of	non-aspectual,	change-of-location	FB	
tasks,	operating	with	relational	attitudes	is	sufficient	for	solving	the	task.	In	the	case	of	tasks	
which	require	tracking	beliefs	or	other	mental	states	which	essentially	involve	aspectuality,	
in	 contrast,	 operating	 with	 relational	 attitudes	 is	 not	 sufficient.	 Rather,	 fully-fledged	
propositional	 attitude	 concepts	 are	 needed.	 The	 pattern	 of	 findings	 in	 our	 studies	might	
thus	 indeed	 reflect	 signature	 limits	 of	 an	 early-developing	 ToM	 capacity	 that	 operates	 by	
tracking	relational	attitudes	rather	than	ascribing	fully-fledged	propositional	attitudes.	This	
possibility	gains	plausibility	when	considering	the	present	findings	in	concert	with	a	recent	
study	 which	 investigated	 the	 same	 structured	 contrast	 between	 aspectual	 and	 non-
aspectual	 tasks	but	used	explicit	 rather	 than	 implicit	 tasks	 (Rakoczy	et	al.,	2015).	 In	 those	
experiments,	children	aged	4	to	6	years	performed	equally	well	on	both	aspecual	and	non-
aspectual	tasks,	and	both	tasks	were	highly	correlated	with	each	other,	and	with	a	standard	
FB	task.	Taking	these	two	sets	of	studies	together	highlights	a	contrast.	There	is	a	pattern	of	
unity	and	convergence	for	performance	on	explicit	FB	tasks,	and	a	pattern	of	disunity	and	
dissociation	for	performance	on	implicit	tasks.	This	contrast	was	recently	found	in	another	
line	 of	 research	 (Low	 et	 al.,	 2014;	 Low	&	Watts,	 2013).	 It	 is	 just	 what	 is	 to	 be	 expected	
according	to	the	two-systems	account.	
Alternatively,	 however,	 the	 present	 findings	 might	 be	 explained	 in	 terms	 of	
performance	 (rather	 than	competence)	 factors.	 	For	example,	subjects	 in	our	experiments	
may	have	assumed,	for	some	reason,	that	the	protagonist	was	omniscient	about	aspects	of	
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objects	 but	 not	 about	 their	 locations.	 	 Such	 an	 assumption	might	 in	 principle	 have	 been	
triggered	 by	 subjects’	 difficulty	 in	 understanding	 and	 coordinating	 different	 aspects	 of	
objects	 (Perner,	Mauer,	 &	 Hildenbrand,	 2011).	 Crucially,	 according	 to	 this	 interpretation,	
children	were	 led	by	extraneous	task	demands	to	make	such	a	omniscience	assumption	in	
the	aspectual	but	not	in	the	non-aspectual	conditions,	even	though	in	principle	they	would	
be	capable	of	understanding	that	people	can	fail	to	be	omniscient	of	objects’	aspects	as	well	
as	their	locations.		
How	 might	 future	 research	 decide	 between	 these	 two	 interpretations?	 The	 two-
systems	interpretation	predicts	that	the	difference	in	performance	between	non-aspectual	
and	 aspectual	 tasks	 will	 be	 observed	 in	 implicit	 but	 not	 explicit	 tasks,	 whereas	 the	
alternative	(‘omniscience’/extraneous	task	demands)	 interpretation	predicts	that,	all	other	
things	being	equal,	this	difference	 in	performance	will	appear	 in	explicit	as	well	as	 implicit	
tasks.	 A	 fundamental	 problem	 for	 the	 omniscience	 interpretation,	 however,	 is	 that	 other	
studies	 have	measured	 implicit	 and	 explicit	 responses	 to	 a	 single	 scenario.	 These	 studies	
have	uniformly	observed	a	difference	in	performance	between	aspectual	and	non-aspectual	
implicit	 tasks	which	disappears	on	explicit	 tasks	 (Low	et	al.,	 2014;	Edwards	&	Low,	2017).		
Furthermore,	 as	 already	mentioned,	 another	 study	developed	explicit	 tasks	 implementing	
the	 very	 same	 contrasts	 between	 aspectual	 and	 non-aspectual	 we	 used,	 and	 found	 no	
performance	differences	between	aspectual	and	non-aspectual	tasks	(Rakoczy	et	al.,	2015).	
This	 suggests	 that	 an	 interpretation	 in	 terms	 of	 omniscience	 about	 aspectuality	 and	
extraneous	task	demands	is	unlikely	to	explain	the	present	findings.	
Three	potential	methodological	 caveats	with	 regard	 to	 the	present	 findings	 should	
be	mentioned.	First,	 it	might	be	wondered	whether	 the	stimuli	 in	 the	present	 study	were	
appropriate	 for	 testing	children’s	understanding	of	 false	beliefs	 involving	aspectuality.	The	
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objects	used	here	(e.g.	bunny/rabbit)	were	selected	because	earlier	research	on	children’s	
object	 individuation	with	 exactly	 these	 stimuli	 show	 that	 even	 1-year-olds	 do	 understand	
the	dual	nature	of	these	objects	(Cacchione,	Schaub,	&	Rakoczy,	2013).	However,	it	might	be	
objected	that	children	could	have	represented	the	situation	in	terms	that	would	undermine	
our	 claim	 to	 be	 testing	 an	 understanding	 of	 false	 beliefs	 involving	 aspectuality.	 After	 all,	
children	 might	 have	 represented	 the	 protagonist	 as	 having	 beliefs	 about	 one	 object	 (a	
bunny,	for	example)	with	another	object	(a	carrot,	for	example)	hidden	inside	it.	If	this	were	
true,	 what	we	 term	 ‘aspectual’	 tasks	would	 in	 fact	 have	 been	 non-aspectual	 tasks	 about	
location	and	containment.	As	this	objection	nicely	 illustrates,	 it	 is	difficult	or	 impossible	to	
create	situations	that	can	only	be	understood	as	involving	aspectuality.	However,	two	points	
should	 be	 noted	 in	 response	 to	 this	 objection.	 First,	 if	 the	 children	 in	 the	 aspectuality	
conditions	 really	 had	 represent	 the	 protagonist	 as	 having	 beliefs	 about	 one	 object	 being	
hidden	in	another,	we	would	expect	their	performance	to	differ	between	FB	and	TB	just	as	it	
did	 on	 the	 non-aspectuality	 conditions.	 In	 fact	 this	 is	 not	 what	 we	 observed.	 Second,	 a	
recent	 study	 with	 older	 children	 (Rakoczy	 et	 al.,	 2015)	 compared	 performance	 on	 tasks	
involving	the	stimuli	used	here	with	new	stimuli	that	also	had	dual	aspects	but	could	not	be	
construed	as	involving	one	object	hiding	another	(for	example,	a	single	object	featured	both	
as	 Susi	 and	 as	 the	 doctor).	 Children’s	 performance	 with	 the	 two	 sets	 of	 stimuli	 was	
absolutely	 comparable.	 This	 suggests	 that	 the	 findings	 from	 the	 present	 experiments	 are	
unlikely	to	depend	on	irrelevant	peculiarities	of	the	stimuli.	
A	second	methodological	caveat	concerns	the	dependent	measure	of	our	tasks.	We	
asked,	What	will	toddlers	spontaneously	do	in	response	to	a	protagonist’s	attempt	to	open,	
or	 search	 in,	 a	 box?	 Using	 this	 dependent	 measure	 limits	 the	 strength	 of	 the	 findings	
compared	 to	 standard,	 explicit	 ToM	 tasks	 which	 use	 a	 two-alternative,	 forced-choice	
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measure	with	exactly	one	correct	answer.	Future	studies	might	extend	the	current	work	to	
compensate	 for	 this	weakness	 by,	 for	 example,	 combining	multiple	 dependent	measures.	
For	 example,	 our	 tasks	 could	 be	 combined	 with	 measures	 of	 proactive	 gaze	 and	 action	
trajectories.	
Third,	and	relatedly,	null	findings	in	the	aspectual	tasks	from	Experiments	1	and	2	are	
inherently	difficult	to	interpret	statistically.	The	absence	of	significant	differences	between	
FB	and	TB	cases	may	simply	be	due	to	a	lack	of	power.	This	is	a	particularly	pressing	concern	
given	 the	 fundamentally	 binary	 quality	 of	 our	 data.	 Future	 studies	 might	 overcome	 this	
weakness	not	only	by	combining	multiple	dependent	measures	but	also	by	using	continuous	
measures.	
	
Conclusions	and	future	directions	
All	 in	 all,	 the	 two	 experiments	 reported	 here	 present	 preliminary	 evidence	
compatible	 with	 the	 claim	 that	 early-developing	 ToM	 capacities	 are	 subject	 to	 signature	
limits.	 Taken	 together	with	 recent	 findings	 that	 on	 an	 explicit	 level	 older	 children	 do	 not	
show	 the	 same	 signature	 limits	 but	 perform	 uniformly	 across	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 FB	 tasks	
(Rakoczy	 et	 al.,	 2015),	 and	 taken	 together	with	 converging	 evidence	 from	 similar	 studies	
with	looking	time	measures	(Low	et	al.,	2014;	Low	&	Watts,	2013),	the	present	findings	are	
in	line	with	predictions	of	the	two-systems	account	of	mindreading.		
But	while	being	in	line	with	the	predictions	of	the	two-systems	account,	the	present	
findings	by	 themselves	 cannot	 strictly	decide	between	 this	and	alternative	accounts	given	
the	methodological	caveats	just	identified.	 	Further	research	is	needed	to	test	for	patterns	
of	 performance	 in	 early	 theory	 of	 mind,	 and	 in	 particular	 for	 signature	 limits.	 	 What	 is	
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required	if	we	are	to	decide	between	competing	accounts	is	a	broad	range	of	implicit	tasks	
concerning	 the	 generality	 and	 flexibility	 of	 young	 children’s	 abilities	 to	 track	 beliefs	 and	
other	mental	 states	 (Yott	&	 Poulin-Dubois,	 2012,	 2016).	 Such	 tasks	must	 involve	 a	 broad	
range	of	scenarios,	belief	contents	and	methods	(such	violation-of-expectation,	anticipatory	
looking,	 communicative	 and	 interactive	 measures).	 Perhaps	 most	 importantly,	 more	
attention	 to	 when	 and	 why	 infants	 fail	 to	 track	 mental	 states	 is	 required,	 ideally	 in	
conjunction	with	 further	direct	comparisons	between	performance	on	 implicit	and	explicit	
tasks.	This	is,	after	all,	where	the	competing	accounts	make	clearly	different	predictions.	
One	particularly	 instructive	strategy	 in	this	context	may	be	to	 investigate	children’s	
readiness	 to	 learn	 to	 track	 beliefs	 about	 novel	 scenarios	 (see	 also	 Heyes,	 2014).	 For	
example,	when	 children	 are	 confronted	 repeatedly	with	 scenarios	 in	which	 novel	 objects	
change	their	(unusual)	locations	or	their	(unusual)	aspects	in	novel	ways,	children’s	learning	
history	might	be	particularly	instructive.	According	to	an	early	competence	account,	infants	
and	 young	 children	 have	 a	 full-blown	 concept	 of	 belief.	 It	 follows	 that	 after	 initial	
asymmetries	regarding	previous	experience	with	unusual	locations	or	unusual	aspects	have	
been	evened	out	 through	 training,	 young	 learners	 should	 be	 capable	 of	 solving	 aspectual	
and	 non-aspectual	 FB	 tasks	 with	 equal	 ease.	 In	 contrast,	 the	 two-systems	 theory	 would	
predict	that	an	initial	asymmetry	 in	performance	between	aspectual	and	non-aspectual	FB	
tasks	should	persist	even	despite	learning	about	object’s	unusual	locations	and	aspects.	
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Experiment	1	
Method	
Participants.	 67	 children	 (26	 females)	 were	 included	 in	 the	 final	 sample,.	 The	
children’s	mean	age	was	31	months	(SD	=	2.66;	range	=	26-36).	9	additional	children	were	
not	included	in	the	analysis	because	they	were	uncooperative	(N=8)	or	due	to	experimental	
error	(N	=	1).	Children	in	both	experiments	were	recruited	from	a	local	database	of	parents	
who	had	volunteered	to	participate	in	child	development	studies	and	were	tested	in	the	lab.	
Children	were	 all	 native	German	 speakers,	 and	 came	 from	mixed	 (mostly	middle	 to	 high)	
socio-economic	backgrounds.			
Design.	Children	were	randomly	assigned	to	one	of	two	groups	who	received	either	a	
change	of	location	or	an	aspectual	FB/TB	task.	Within	each	group,	half	of	the	children	were	
randomly	assigned	to	sub-groups	receiving	FB	or	TB	versions	of	the	task.	There	were	thus	4	
conditions:	non-aspectual,	change-of-location	 false	belief	 (Loc_FB),	non-aspectual,	change-
of-location	TB	(Loc_TB),	aspectual	false	belief	(Asp_FB)	and	aspectual	true	belief	(Asp_TB).	
Each	child	received	two	(in	two	exceptional	cases	three;	see	below)	trials	of	one	of	the	four	
conditions.				
Materials.	In	the	non-aspectual	tasks,	one	toy	object	(a	ball,	a	soft	toy	rabbit,	a	toy	
dog	or	toy	donkey)	per	trial	and	two	boxes	were	used.	In	the	aspectual	task,	one	reversible	
mini	soft	toy	(a	bear,	bunny,	tiger,	pig),	which	could	be	turned	inside	out	through	a	zipper	
and	transformed	(into	a	honey	barrel,	a	carrot,	a	snail	and	a	cake,	respectively,	see	Figure	1),	
and	one	box	were	used	per	 trial.	Boxes	were	covered	with	a	 tissue	on	the	 inside	 to	 leave	
children	 ignorant	 about	 the	 (empty)	 content.	 A	 puppet	 called	 Susi	 (animated	 by	 E2)	 was	
used	as	protagonist.		
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Procedure.	 Each	 child	 was	 tested	 in	 an	 interactive	 play	 setting	 with	 two	
experimenters,	with	a	parent	present	during	the	session.	Each	session	began	by	the	child’s	
playing	one	or	two	warm-up	games	with	E1	and	the	puppet	Susi.		Susi	was	animated	by	E2.	
The	warm-up	games	were	followed	by	a	standardized	warm-up	trial.	For	the	warm-up	trial	
and	the	subsequent	 test	 trials,	children	were	asked	to	sit	on	a	cushion	beside	E1,	and	2m	
from	E2	and	the	puppet.	The	parent	was	allowed	to	sit	behind	the	child,	and	was	instructed	
not	to	interfere	by	saying	or	showing	anything	to	the	child.	
	
	
Figure	1.Examples	of	the	stimuli	used	in	the	aspectual	false	belief	task.	
Standardly,	 children	 received	 two	 trials	 of	 the	 condition	 they	 were	 randomly	
assigned	to.	In	exceptional	cases	a	third	trial	was	administered;	this	was	done	if	the	child’s	
responses	in	both	trials	were	coded	as	‘ambiguous’	(see	below	for	details	on	coding).	
Warm-up	trial.	E1	introduced	Susi	and	the	child	to	a	soft	toy	lion.	E1	then	gave	the	
lion	 to	 Susi,	 who	 expressed	 a	 liking	 for	 it.	 Susi	 then	 announced	 that	 she	 had	 forgotten	
something,	and	left	the	room	through	a	door	behind	her.	In	her	absence,	E1	asked	the	child	
to	play	a	trick	on	Susi	by	hiding	the	lion	(e.g.	in	a	drawer).	After	this,	E1	and	the	child	called	
Susi.	On	her	return,	Susi	looked	around	in	the	room	searching	for	the	lion.	Susi	then	asked	
the	child	 for	help.	 If	 the	child	hesitated	to	help,	E1	prompted	the	child	to	help	Susi.	 If	 the	
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child	still	refused,	E1	said:	“Come	on,	we’ll	do	it	together”.	When	Susi	was	shown	the	lion,	
she	said,	“Ah,	there	is	the	lion.	Thank	you!”	
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Table	1.	Detailed	event	sequences	of	the	spontaneous	helping	tasks	in	Experiment	1	
	 Non-aspectual,	change-of-location	tasks	 Aspectual	tasks	
1	 Warm-up	trial	
E2	with	puppet	Susi	sits	approximately	2m	vis	á	vis	the	child	and	E1,	all	on	their	particular	cushion.	E1	shows	a	plush	lion	to	both:	“Look,	
what	I’ve	got	here!”	Susi	says	“Wow,	a	lion,	it’s	great,	I	want	it!”	and	reaches	for	it.	E1	says	“Do	you	want	it,	Susi?”	and	gives	it	to	her.	
Susi	says	“Oh	no,	I	forgot	sth.!	I	have	to	leave	for	short.	I’ll	be	right	back.”	She	leaves	the	room	through	a	door	behind	her.	E1	whispers	
to	the	child	“You	know	what?	Now	we’ll	play	a	trick	on	Susi.	We	hide	the	 lion.	Where	should	we	hide	 it?”	E1	and	the	child	choose	a	
location	 and	 hide	 the	 lion.	 E1	 behaves	 in	 a	 sneaky	 way,	 giggling	 and	 gesturing	 and	 whispering	 “Shh”.	 Then	 they	 sit	 down	 at	 their	
cushions.	They	call	Susi	into	the	room.	Susi	re-enters,	looks	around	and	says	“Oh,	but	where	is	the	lion?”	and	expresses	disappointment:	
“Hmm.	Oh	no.”	She	asks	the	child	for	help	(“Can	you	help	me?”).	 If	the	child	hesitates	to	help,	E1	prompts	“You	can	help	her”.	 If	the	
child	still	refuses,	E1	proposes	to	help	together	(“Should	we	help	her	together?”).	When	Susi	is	shown	the	lion	she	says	“Ah,	there	it	is,	
thank	you”.		
2	 	
	
	
	
--	
Introduction	of	the	dual	aspect	objects	
Susi	 announces	 “Oh	 no,	 I	 forgot	 something!	 I	 have	 to	 leave	 for	
short”	and	leaves.	E1	shows	a	reversible	mini	soft	toy	to	the	child	
and	its	dual	aspectuality:	“Look	what	I	got	here!	A	bunny!	And	now	
I’ll	 show	you	something:	 the	bunny	 is	also	a	carrot.	Where	 is	 the	
bunny	now?	Can	you	make	it	so	that	it’s	a	bunny	again?”	The	child	
transforms	 the	 object,	 if	 necessary	 with	 the	 help	 of	 E1.	 E1	
introduces	the	2nd	object	 in	the	same	way.	Then	she	emphasizes:	
“And	Susi	doesn’t	know	that,	right?”	She	asks	the	child	to	play	sth.	
and	to	call	Susi	back.	
3	 Introduction	of	the	boxes/box	
E1	shows	one	box	to	the	child:	“Look	I	have	a	box	here.	And	you	can	open	it	 like	this.	You	want	to	try?”	She	waits	until	the	child	has	
opened	the	box,	eventually	with	her	help.	She	pays	attention	that	the	child	does	not	grasp	inside	and	closes	the	box	again.	(She	shows	
the	2nd	box	in	the	same	way	in	the	Non-aspectual	tasks).	During	all	time,	Susi	and	E2	turn	their	heads	away	from	the	scene.		
4	 Introduction	of	the	target	object	
E1	shows	the	first	target	object	to	Susi	and	the	child	(“Look	what	I’ve	got	here!”).	Susi	reaches	for	the	object	saying	“Wow,	a	‘bunny’,	it’s	
great!”	E1	gives	it	to	her	(“Do	you	want	it?”).	Now	Susi	announces:	“Oh	no,	I	forgot	sth.!	I	have	to	leave	for	short.	I	put	the	bunny	in	this	
box.	‘E1’	can	you	help	me?	Okay.	Because	now	I	have	to	leave	for	short”.		She	puts	the	bunny	into	the	one	box	and	leaves.		
5	 Location-change	
False	belief:	E1	says	“You,	[name	of	child],	shall	we	play	a	trick	on	
Susi?	 Look,	 what	 I	 do	 now.	 Okay.	 Hihi.	 Shh!”	 She	 changes	 the	
location	 of	 the	 target	 in	 a	 sneaky	 way	 emphasizing	 at	 the	 end	
“And	Susi	can’t	see	that,	right?”	
True	Belief:	Susi	comes	back	a	few	seconds	after	she	left.	E1	says	
“Look,	 Susi	 and	 [name	 of	 child]!	 Like	 this	 and	 like	 this!”	 She	
changes	 the	 location	 of	 the	 target,	 thereby	 alternating	 gaze	
between	 the	 child	 and	 the	 puppet.	 Susi	 observes	 this	 event	
closely	 saying	 ”Ah	 I	 see!	 Yes!”	 Then	 she	 takes	 her	 seat	 on	 her	
cushion	between	the	boxes	again.	
Aspect-change	
False	belief:	E1	says	“You,	[name	of	child],	shall	we	play	a	trick	on	
Susi?	 Look,	what	 I	 do	now.	Okay.	Hihi.	 Shh!”	 and	 transforms	 the	
object	 into	 its	 2nd	 aspect	 in	 a	 sneaky	 way	 and	 puts	 it	 back,	
emphasizing	at	the	end	“And	Susi	can’t	see	that,	right?”	
True	Belief:	Susi	comes	back	a	few	seconds	after	she	left.	E1	says	
“Look,	 Susi	 and	 [name	 of	 child]!	 Like	 this	 and	 like	 this!”	 She	
changes	 the	 aspect	 of	 the	 target,	 thereby	 alternating	 gaze	
between	the	child	and	the	puppet.	Susi	observes	this	event	closely	
saying	 ”Ah	 I	 see!	 Yes!”	 Then	 she	 takes	 her	 seat	 on	 her	 cushion	
again.	
6	 	
	
--	
Location-change	
E1	says	“And	now,	look,	Susi	and	[name	of	child],	what	I	do	now!	
Like	this	and	like	this!”	She	takes	the	target	out	of	the	box	and	
places	it	in	the	same	distance	as	the	box	from	the	Susi	and	the	
child	on	the	carpet.	Susi	observes	this	event	closely	saying	”Ah	I	
see!	Yes!”	Then	she	takes	her	seat	on	her	cushion	again.	
7	 The	signal	
Susi	looks	2	times	from	one	box	to	the	other/from	the	box	to	the	object,	saying	”Hmm”	in	a	thoughtful	way.	Then	she	says	”Okay”,	
approaches	one	box,	pulls	two	times	on	the	top/lid/cover,	expressing	effort	(“Uff”)	and	then	sits	down	at	her	cushion,	looking	down,	
expressing	disappointment	(“Hmm.	Oh	no!”).	If	the	child	had	not	reacted	until	now,	she	says	“Hmm”,	looks	at	the	child	and	down	again.	
If	the	child	did	not	react	she	asks	”Can	you	help	me?”	If	the	child	hesitates,	E1	prompts:	“You	can	help	her”.	If	the	child	still	refuses,	E1	
proposes	“Should	we	help	her	together?”	but	waits	where	the	child	moves.	If	the	child	helps	to	open	one	box,	E1	disrupts	quickly	and	
says:	“Come	on	we	play	another	game	and	removes	box(es)	and	object	to	begin	a	second	trial	with	different	boxes	and	a	different	target	
object.	If	the	child	in	the	aspectuality	condition	gives	the	object	to	Susi,	she	neutrally	says	“Hmm”	and	waits	a	few	seconds	(to	see	if	the	
child	also	transforms	the	object).	Then	E1	disrupts	and	removes	box	and	object.			
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Test	trials	
(1)	Non-aspectual	tasks	(following	Buttelmann	et	al.,	2009).	E1	introduced	two	boxes	
(green	&	blue	or	yellow	&	red	in	counterbalanced	order)	to	the	child	(Susi	turned	away	so	
she	couldn’t	see),	taught	the	child	how	to	open	and	close	them	(pulling	an	elastic	band	from	
a	hook)	and	prompted	the	child	to	open	the	box	herself.	The	child	opened	and	closed	both	
boxes	successfully	(with	the	help	of	E1	if	the	child	was	not	able	to	do	so	on	her	own)	but	was	
prevented	 by	 E1	 from	 grasping	 inside	 under	 the	 tissue.	 E1	 placed	 the	 two	 boxes	
equidistantly	 between	 Susi	 and	 the	 child	 (approximately	 1,5m	 apart,	 color	 and	 side	
counterbalanced)	and	showed	one	of	three	toys	(which	one	was	fully	counterbalanced)	to	
them.	Susi	excitedly	expressed	her	desire/liking	for	the	toy	and	E1	gave	it	to	her.	Susi	then	
announced	again	that	she	forgot	something	and	would	put	the	toy	into	box	1	for	the	time	of	
her	absence.	She	did	so	with	the	help	of	E1	(because	she	wasn’t	able	to	open	the	box	on	her	
own).	The	following	sequence	varied	between	conditions	(see	Fig.	2):		
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Figure	2.	Schematic	event	sequences	of	the	location	and	aspectual	tasks	in	Exp.	1.	
	
  FB	condition:	Susi	left	and	in	her	absence,	E1	proposed	to	‘play	a	trick’	on	Susi.	She	
took	the	toy	out	of	the	box	and	placed	it	in	the	other	box,	giggling	and	gesturing	and	
whispering	“Shh”.			
  TB	condition:	Susi	left	and	returned	a	few	seconds	later.	In	her	presence,	E1	took	the	
toy	 out	 of	 the	 box	 and	 placed	 it	 in	 the	 other	 box,	 saying:	 “Look,	 Susi	 and	 [child’s	
name]!”	and	alternating	gaze	between	the	child	and	E2.	Susi	observed	the	 location	
change	closely,	saying:	“Ah	I	see!	Yes!”		
After	 her	 return	 (FB)/the	 observed	 location	 change	 (TB)	 Susi	moved	 back	 to	 her	 position	
between	the	boxes,	looked	from	one	box	to	the	other	saying	first	“Hmm”	and	then	“Okay”.	
She	tried	to	open	the	box	where	the	object	formerly	was	located	by	pulling	on	the	lid	shortly	
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(this	event	is	referred	to	as	the	‘signal’	in	what	follows).	She	failed	to	open	the	box	and	sat	
down	again	showing	disappointment:	“Hmm.	Oh	no!”	 If	 the	child	did	not	react,	she	asked	
“Can	you	help	me?”	If	the	child	still	showed	no	reaction,	E1	prompted	the	child	to	help	and	
if	 the	 child	 still	 refused	 E1	 asked	 to	 help	 together	 (“Should	 we	 help	 her	 together?”)	 but	
didn’t	move	and	waited	where	the	child	would	go.	Children’s	 reactions	 to	 the	signal	were	
coded.	The	task	was	repeated	with	different	boxes	and	a	different	target	toy.	
(2)	Aspectual	 task.	After	 the	warm-up	 trial	 children	were	 first	 familiarized	with	 the	
dual	aspectuality	of	the	target	objects.	To	this	end,	the	puppet	left	the	room	and	E1	showed	
the	 first	 mini	 soft	 toy	 (which	 one	 was	 fully	 counterbalanced)	 to	 the	 child.	 Then	 she	
transformed	it	to	its	2nd	aspect	saying:	“Look!	The	X	is	also	a	Y!”	(e.g.	bunny	and	carrot).	She	
did	 that	 in	 a	 sneaky	way,	whispering	 “Shh”	 and	 told	 the	 child:	 “Susi	 does	 not	 know	 that,	
right?”	to	ensure	that	the	child	would	not	assume	that	Susi	knew	all	aspects	of	the	object.	
The	child	was	then	asked	to	transform	the	object	into	its	original	state:	“Can	you	make	it	so	
that	 it	 is	 a	 bunny	 again?”	 If	 the	 child	 was	 not	 able	 or	 not	 willing,	 E1	 helped	 and	 both	
transformed	the	object	 together.	This	was	 repeated	with	a	second	object	which	was	 later	
used	for	the	second	test	trial.		
For	 the	 test	 trials	 Susi	 returned.	 E1	 now	 showed	one	 box	 (colors	 counterbalanced	
across	children	and	trials)	to	the	child	(Susi	turned	away	so	she	couldn’t	see	this),	taught	the	
child	how	to	open	and	close	it	(pulling	an	elastic	band	from	a	hook)	and	prompted	the	child	
to	open	the	box	herself.	The	child	opened	and	closed	the	box	successfully	(with	the	help	of	
E1	 in	 case	 the	 child	 was	 not	 able	 to	 do	 so	 on	 her	 own)	 but	 was	 prevented	 by	 E1	 from	
grasping	 inside	under	 the	 tissue.	E1	placed	 the	box	at	one	side	 (approximately	0,8m	from	
the	center,	side	counterbalanced)	between	Susi	and	the	child	and	showed	the	first	mini	soft	
toy	to	them.	Susi	excitedly	expressed	her	desire/liking	for	the	toy	and	E1	gave	it	to	her.	Susi	
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then	announced	again	that	she	forgot	something	and	would	put	the	toy	in	one	of	the	boxes	
for	the	time	of	her	absence.	She	did	so	with	the	help	of	E1.	The	following	sequence	varied	
between	conditions:			
  FB	condition:	Susi	left	and	E1	proposed	to	‘play	a	trick’	on	Susi.	She	took	the	toy	out	
of	the	box,	transformed	it	into	the	other	aspect	(e.g.	a	carrot),	giggling	and	gesturing	
and	whispering	“Shh”,	and	returned	it	into	the	box.		
  TB	condition:	Susi	left	and	returned	a	few	seconds	later.	In	her	presence,	E1	took	the	
toy	out	of	the	box,	transformed	it	-	while	saying:	“Look	Susi	and	[child’s	name]!”	and	
alternating	 gaze	 between	 the	 child	 and	 E2	 -	 and	 put	 it	 back	 into	 the	 box.	 Susi	
observed	this	event	closely,	saying:	“Ah	I	see!	Yes!”		
After	 her	 return	 (FB)/	 the	 observed	 aspect	 change	 (TB)	 Susi	 moved	 back	 to	 her	 original	
position.	Now,	E1	 stated	again:	 “Look	Susi	and	 [child’s	name]!”	and	 took	 the	 transformed	
toy	(e.g.	carrot)	out	of	the	box	and	placed	 it	approximately	1m	away	from	the	box	on	the	
carpet	 equidistant	 between	 Susi	 and	 the	 child.	 Susi	 observed	 this	 location-change	 closely	
saying	“Ah	I	see!	Yes!”,	then	she	looked	from	the	box	to	the	object	saying	first	“Hmm”	and	
then	“Okay”.	She	then	tried	to	open	the	box.	This	signal	and	the	following	events	were	the	
same	 as	 in	 the	 location-change	 task.	 The	 task	 was	 repeated	 with	 a	 different	 box	 and	 a	
different	target	reversible	toy.	
	
	
Coding.	For	both	studies	sessions	were	coded	from	videotape	by	one	coder.	The	child’s	
first	reaction	to	the	signal	of	the	protagonist	(the	attempt	to	open	the	box)	was	coded	and	it	
was	determined	whether	it	fell	into	one	of	the	two	central	categories:		
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  open	box	1	(in	both	tasks):	 if	 the	child	clearly	referred	to	box	1	(by	the	puppet)	by	
approaching	the	box	and	opening	it	successfully	or	by	trying	to	open	it	(e.g.	pulling	
the	elastic	band)	even	if	not	successfully.			
  open	 box	 2	 (in	 the	 non-aspectual	 tasks)/give	 the	 object	 to	 the	 puppet	 (in	 the	
aspectual	 tasks):	 if	 the	 child	 clearly	 referred	 to	 box	 2	 by	 approaching	 the	box	 and	
opening	it	successfully	or	by	trying	to	open	it,	or	handed	the	object	to	the	puppet.	
There	were	two	ways	in	which	a	given	trial	could	fail	to	fall	into	one	of	these	two	categories:	
  ambiguous:	 This	 coding	 applied	 if	 the	 child	 showed	 a	 behavior	 that	 clearly	 was	 a	
reaction	 to	 the	 signal	 (i.e.	 sat	 still	before	and	began	 to	 respond	after	 the	puppet’s	
attempt	to	open	box	1)	but	which	did	not	fit	either	of	the	two	above	categories.	This	
could	be	because	the	child	did	perform	both	above	behaviors	(e.g.	taking	the	object	
and	putting	it	in	box	1)	or	because	she	did	something	totally	irrelevant	(e.g.	shaking	
the	hand	of	the	puppet	when	asked	for	help).	
  invalid:	 This	 coding	was	 given	 if	 a	 parent	 interfered,	 if	 the	 child	 did	 not	 show	any	
reaction	at	all,	 if	the	child	left	the	scene	during	the	trial	or	did	not	pay	attention	to	
the	event	sequence,	or	 if	 the	child	could	not	be	held	back	 from	reacting	too	early,	
that	 is,	producing	a	behavior	 (such	as	opening	box	1	or	 fetching	the	object)	before	
the	signal	 (and	 thus	not	 in	 response	 to	 the	 implicit	 test	question	–	which	makes	 it	
impossible	to	interpret	what	this	behavior	means	regarding	their	ascription	of	beliefs	
to	the	protagonist.	
A	second	observer	who	was	blind	 for	 the	experimental	condition	and	hypotheses	coded	a	
20%	sample	of	14	 randomly	selected	 tapes	 for	 reliability	which	was	к	=	1.00	 for	 the	 four-
category-coding	(open	box	1,	open	box	2/give	object,	invalid,	ambiguous).	
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Results	
	
For	3	children	both	trials	were	coded	as	invalid	because	the	parent	interfered	in	both	
trials	(N	=	1	in	the	Asp_FB	condition),	because	the	child	did	not	pay	attention	to	the	event	
sequences	(N	=	1	in	the	Loc_TB	condition)	or	showed	no	reaction	to	the	signal	(N	=	1	in	the	
Asp_FB	condition).	 	Data	 from	64	children	were	 thus	used	 in	 the	 final	 analysis.	Mean	age	
was	M	=	31;3	(SD	=	3.09,	6	girls,	10	boys)	in	the	non-aspectual	FB	condition,	M	=	31;3	(SD	=	
2.14,	 6	 girls,	 10	 boys)	 in	 the	 non-aspectual	 TB	 condition,	M	 =	 31;2	 (SD	 =	 2.73,	 6	 girls,	 10	
boys)	 in	 the	 aspectual	 FB	 and	M	 =	 31;1	 (SD	 =	 2.48,	 7	 girls,	 9	 boys)	 in	 the	 aspectual	 TB	
condition.	There	was	no	significant	age	difference	between	conditions	(F(3)	=	.11,	p	=	.96).	
	
Trials	coded	as	invalid	or	ambiguous.	Of	the	64	children,	the	first	trial	was	coded	as	
invalid	in	8	cases	(4	in	the	Loc_FB,	3	in	the	Loc_TB	and	1	in	the	Asp_FB	condition)	because	of	
experimental	error	 (N	=	1),	because	the	child	was	 inattentive	 (N	=	3),	did	not	react	 to	the	
signal	(N	=	1)	or	reacted	before	the	signal	(N	=	3).	For	2	children	the	first	trial	was	coded	as	
ambiguous	reaction	(both	in	the	Asp_TB	condition)	because	the	child	took	the	not-referred-
to	 object	 and	 tried	 to	 put	 it	 in	 the	 box	 (N	 =	 1)	 or	 gave	 another	 object	 to	 Susi	 (N	 =	 1).	 2	
children	 showed	 an	 ambiguous	 reaction	 in	 both	 first	 trials	 (gave	 a	 car	 to	 Susi/shook	 her	
hand;	 in	 the	Loc_FB	and	Asp_TB	condition).	As	explained	above,	because	both	 trials	were	
ambiguous,	a	third	trial	was	administered	 in	these	cases.	All	 in	all,	64	children	(32	each	 in	
the	 non-aspectuality	 and	 aspectuality	 conditions)	 received	 at	 least	 one	 valid	 (including	
ambiguous)	trial	and	for	these	children	at	least	one	trial	was	also	unambiguous.		
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Main	analyses.	For	the	main	analysis,	the	first	valid	and	unambiguous	trial	of	the	64	
children	to	which	this	applied	was	used.	Invalid	and	ambiguous	trials	were	replaced	by	the	
second	 trial	 if	 this	 was	 a	 valid	 trial.	 When	 possible,	 one-tailed	 tests	 were	 conducted	
whenever	directed	a	priori	hypotheses	were	tested	(such	that	children	perform	more	often	
“open	 box	 1”	 in	 contrast	 to	 “open	 box	 2/give	 object”	 behavior	 in	 the	 TB	 than	 in	 the	 FB	
conditions).	Figure	3	depicts	children’s	helping	behavior	in	the	first	valid	and	unambiguous	
trial.	 Children’s	 helping	 behavior	 differed	 significantly	 between	 non-aspectual	 FB	 and	 TB	
conditions	(p	=	.037,	ΦCramer	=	.38,	one-tailed	Fisher’s	exact	test).	Concerning	the	aspectual	
conditions,	in	contrast,	helping	behavior	did	not	differ	significantly	between	FB	and	TB	(p	=	
.166,	ΦCramer	=	.26,	one-tailed	Fisher’s	exact	test).		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 	 	 (a)		 	 	 	 	 	 (b)	
	
Figure	 3.	 Number	 of	 children	 showing	 the	 different	 kinds	 of	 helping	 behavior	 in	 the	 first	 valid	 and	
unambiguous	trial	of	(a)	the	non-aspectual	tasks,	(b)	the	aspectual	task.	[*p	<	.05]	
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Complementary	 analysis.	When	 comparing	 the	 non-aspectual	 and	 aspectual	 tasks	
for	FB	and	TB,	respectively,	results	revealed	that	children	tended	to	perform	differently	 in	
the	location	than	in	the	aspectual	FB	tasks	(opening	box	1	less	often	in	the	location	than	in	
the	aspectual	FB	tasks,	p	=	 .037,	one-tailed	Fisher’s	exact	test).	No	differences	were	found	
for	the	two	TB	tasks	(p	=	.166).	
	
Analyses	with	ambiguous	trials	included.	The	difference	between	conditions	in	the	
non-aspectual	tasks	was	less	clear	when	ambiguous	responses	were	included	in	a	two-tailed	
exact	test	as	a	third	category	(see	Table	1),	with	a	trend	remaining	(p	=	.073,	VCramer	=	.39,	
two-tailed	 Fisher’s	 exact	 test).	 In	 the	aspectual	 task,	 conditions	did	not	differ	 significantly	
also	 when	 including	 ambiguous	 trials	 in	 the	 analysis	 (p	 =	 .110,	 VCramer	 =	 .39,	 two-tailed	
Fisher’s	exact	test).	
	
Table	1.	Helping	behavior	in	the	first	valid	trial	including	ambiguous	responses.	
	 Non-aspectual	task	 Aspectual	task	
	 True	belief	 False	belief	 True	belief	 False	belief	
open	box	1	 12	 6	 12	 12	
open	box	2/give	object	 4	 9	 1	 4	
ambiguous	response	 0	 1	 3	 0	
	
Aggregate	score	including	all	trials.	Since	for	a	large	number	of	children	at	least	one	
trial	had	been	coded	 invalid	or	ambiguous	 (N	=	10	 in	 the	non-aspectual	 task;	N	=	4	 in	 the	
aspectual	 task)	 a	 sum	 score	 of	 two	 trials	 did	 not	 constitute	 a	 valid	measure	 of	 children’s	
overall	performance.	In	order	to	also	include	the	second	valid	and	unambiguous	trials	in	the	
analysis,	 an	 aggregate	 score	 was	 calculated	 for	 which	 children	 were	 separated	 into	 two	
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groups:	 children	who	 consistently	 referred	 to	box	2	 (non-aspectual	 task)/	 gave	 the	object	
(aspectual	 task)	 in	 their	valid	and	unambiguous	trials	and	children	who	did	not	do	so	 (see	
Table	2).	One-tailed	Fisher’s	exact	 tests	 confirmed	 the	 results	of	 the	main	analysis:	 in	 the	
non-aspectual	task	helping	behavior	differed	significantly	between	the	TB	and	FB	condition	
conditions	 (p	 =	 .037,	ΦCramer	 =	 .38),	whereas	 in	 the	aspectual	 task	no	 such	difference	was	
found	(p	=	.50,	ΦCramer	=	.11).	
	
Table	2.	Aggregate	score	of	children’s	helping	behavior	in	both	trials.	
	 Non-aspectual	task	 Aspectual	task	
	 TB	 FB	 TB	 FB	
consistently	referred	to	box	
2/give	object	 4	 10	 1	 2	
did	not	consistently	refer	to	
box	2/give	object	 12	 6	 15	 14	
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Experiment	2	
Method	
Participants	137	children	(61	females)	were	included	in	the	final	sample4.	Children’s	
mean	age	was	26	months	 (SD	=	1.92;	range	=	24-30).	Five	additional	children	were	tested	
but	not	included	in	the	analysis	because	they	were	uncooperative.	
	
Design.	The	design	was	the	same	as	in	Exp.	1.	In	Exp.	2	children	received	up	to	two	
subsequent	trials	of	one	of	the	four	conditions	to	which	they	were	randomly	assigned:	non-
aspectual	FB,	non-aspectual	TB,	aspectual	FB,	aspectual	TB.	(Two	short	additional	tasks	were	
administered	 during	 warm-up	 and	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 session,	 which	 focused	 on	 another	
research	question	and	are	therefore	not	reported	here.)	
	
Materials.	In	the	non-aspectual	tasks,	two	different	toys	(whose	reversible	function	
was	not	shown)	per	trial	(a	bear,	bunny,	tiger	or	pig)	were	used	as	stimuli	and	one	(green	or	
orange)	box.	In	the	aspectual	task,	one	reversible	mini	soft	toy	per	trial	and	one	box	were	
used.	Boxes	had	several	doors	and	openings:	one	opening	on	the	upper		
surface	and	three	doors	which	could	be	opened	by	pulling	a	grip	(see	Figure	4).	All	openings	
were	covered	with	a	tissue	on	the	inside	and	additional	tissue	panels	were	spanned	inside	
the	box	so	that	it	was	not	easy	to	determine	if	the	box	was	empty	or	not.	In	contrast	to	Exp.	
1,	E2	herself	played	the	role	of	the	protagonist	to	avoid	that	the	younger	children	would	be	
afraid	of	the	puppet	
																																								 																				4	Since	we	assumed	the	new	method	of	Experiment	2	would	generally	make	the	tasks	more	demanding,	competence	more	difficult	to	detect	and	effect	sized	thus	smaller,	we	reasoned	that	a	significantly	bigger	sample	than	in	Experiment	1	would	be	appropriate.		
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.	 	
Figure	4.	Example	of	the	boxes	used	in	Exp.	2.	
	
Procedure.	For	warm-up	games	and	the	subsequent	test	trials	parent	and	child	were	
asked	to	take	a	seat	at	a	table.	The	parent	had	been	instructed	not	to	interfere	by	saying	or	
showing	anything	to	the	child.	Each	session	began	by	the	child’s	playing	two	warm-up	games	
(puzzle,	picture	book)	with	both	experimenters.	In	contrast	to	Exp.	1	no	warm-up	trial	with	a	
hiding	 procedure	was	 administered	 because	 this	was	 considered	 to	 possibly	 differentially	
simplify	correct	helping	only	 in	 the	non-aspectual	 tasks	as	opposed	 to	 the	aspectual	 tasks	
(see	Appendix	2	for	details).	
	
Test	trials		
(1)	Non-aspectual	task.	During	the	last	warm-up	game,	E1	left	the	table	and	went	behind	
curtains,	 where	 she	 was	 not	 visible	 for	 the	 child.	 Now,	 E2	 told	 the	 child	 that	 she	 forgot	
something	and	left	the	room.	E1	appeared	from	behind	the	curtains,	greeted	the	child	and	
sat	down	at	the	table.	Accidentally,	she	placed	a	tissue	on	one	side	of	the	table.	Then	she	
took	 two	soft	 toys	out	of	a	bag,	 showed	them	to	 the	child,	placed	them	on	the	 table	and	
returned	 behind	 the	 curtains.	 At	 this	 point,	 E2	 re-entered	 the	 room	 and	 discovered	 the	
objects	and	picked	them	up	excitedly.	Then	she	 looked	disappointed,	announcing	that	she	
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forgot	something	again	and	had	to	leave.	She	looked	around	and	placed	one	box	at	one	side	
on	the	table.	Then	she	told	the	child	that	she	would	put	the	objects	into	the	box	for	the	time	
of	her	absence	and	put	 them	 into	 the	upper-side	opening.	The	 following	 sequence	varied	
between	conditions	(see	Fig.	5):		
  FB	condition:	E2	 left	and	E1	reappeared	from	behind	the	curtains.	She	greeted	the	
child	and	proposed	to	‘play	a	trick’	on	E2,	took	one	of	the	objects	out	of	the	box	and	
placed	 it	under	the	tissue	(in	such	a	way	that	 it	was	neither	visible	that	this	object	
was	under	the	tissue	nor	whether	there	was	any	object	there),	giggling	and	gesturing	
and	whispering	“Shh”.		
  TB	condition:	E1	performed	 the	very	 same	action	of	 taking	 the	out	of	 the	box	and	
placing	it	under	the	tissue	as	in	the	FB	condition,	but	the	crucial	difference	was	that	
this	 was	 witnessed	 by	 E2	 who	 did	 not	 leave	 the	 room.	 Rather,	 E2	 stayed	 and	 E1	
appeared	 from	behind	 the	 curtains,	 telling	 E2	 she	wanted	 to	 show	her	 something	
first.	Then,	but	saying	“Look,	what	I	do	now!”,	while	E2	observed	this	closely	and	said	
“Ah	I	see!	Yes!”	Then	E1	returned	behind	the	curtains	and	E2	told	the	child	she	now	
really	had	to	leave	and	left	the	room	for	several	seconds.		
By	her	return	(in	both	conditions),	E2	approached	the	table,	said	“Okay”	and	reached	 into	
the	box	though	the	upper	side	opening.	She	took	the	remaining	object	out	and	put	it	beside	
the	box	and	began	to	search	in	the	box	again	(moving	her	hand	inside	the	box,	trying	to	look	
inside,	saying	“Hmm,	Eh?	 I	don’t	understand…	but	where	 is….”).	As	 in	Exp.	1,	 this	event	 is	
referred	 to	 as	 the	 ‘signal’.	 If	 the	 child	 did	 not	 react,	 E2	 sat	 down	 and	 expressed	
disappointment:	“Hm.	Oh	no!”	 If	still	no	reaction	followed,	she	asked	“Can	you	help	me?”	
The	task	was	repeated	once	with	a	different	box	and	two	different	target	toys	if	E2	was	not	
sure	whether	the	child’s	reaction	to	the	signal	could	clearly	be	assigned	to	one	of	the	two	
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central	 categories:	 helping	 to	 search	 in	 the	 box	 (e.g.	 by	 pulling	 one	 of	 the	 door	 grips)	 or	
giving	the	object	under	the	tissue	to	E2.		
	
	
	
Figure	5.	Schematic	event	sequences	of	the	location	and	aspectual		FB/TB	tasks	in	Exp..	2.		
	
(2)	Aspectual	task.	The	procedure	of	the	aspectual	task	was	exactly	the	same	as	for	
the	 non-aspectual	 task,	 except	 for	 the	 following	 differences:	 When	 E1	 appeared	 from	
behind	the	curtains	for	the	first	time,	she	introduced	only	one	reversible	mini	soft	toy	to	the	
child	and	–	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	non-aspectual	 task	 -	 transformed	 it	 to	 its	2nd	aspect	 saying:	
“Look!	The	X	is	also	an	Y!”	(e.g.,	bunny	and	carrot).	She	did	that	in	a	sneaky	way,	whispering	
“Shh”	and	 told	 the	child:	 “’E2	does	not	know	that,	 right?”,	again,	 to	ensure	 that	 the	child	
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would	 not	 assume	 E1	 to	 know	 all	 aspects	 of	 the	 object.	 The	 child	 was	 then	 asked	 to	
transform	the	object	into	its	original	state:	“Can	you	make	it	so	that	it	is	a	bunny	again?”	If	
the	child	was	not	able	or	not	willing,	E1	helped	and	both	transformed	the	object	together.	
Then	 E1	 placed	 the	 object	 in	 its	 original	 aspect	 on	 the	 table	 and	 returned	 behind	 the	
curtains.	The	following	sequence	was	the	same	as	in	the	non-aspectual	task,	despite	the	fact	
that	E2	–	upon	her	return	-	discovered	only	one	object	and	put	this	one	into	the	box	before	
she	 left	 again	 in	 the	 FB	 condition.	 But	 instead	 of	 changing	 the	 location	 of	 one	 object,	 E1	
appeared	from	behind	the	curtains,	took	the	object	out	of	the	box,	transformed	it	to	its	2nd	
aspect	and	put	it	back	into	the	box.	 	This	was	done	either	in	the	absence	(FB)	or	presence	
(TB)	 of	 E2	 and	 in	 exactly	 the	 same	 sneaky/not	 sneaky	 way	 as	 in	 the	 non-aspectual	 task.	
When	E2	reentered	the	room	she	behaved	exactly	the	same	as	in	the	non-aspectual	task.		
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	Table	2.	Schmematic	procedure	of	the		tasks	in	Exp.	2	 	
	
Non-aspectual,	change-of-location	task	 Aspectual	task	
1	 Setting	
E2	(protagonist)	sat	vis	á	vis	the	child	on	the	lap	of	her	parent	at	a	table.	During	two	warm-up	games	(puzzle,	picture	book)	E1	also	sat	
on	the	short	side	of	the	table.	During	the	last	warm-up	game	E2	left	the	table	and	went	behind	curtains	where	she	was	not	visible	for	E2	
and	the	child.		
2	 Introduction	of	two	single-aspect	target	objects	
E2	 announces:	 “Oh	 no,	 I	 forgot	 something!	 I	 have	 to	 leave	 for	
short.”	 and	 leaves.	 E1	 appears	 from	 behind	 the	 curtains,	 greets	
the	 child	 and	 sits	 down	 at	 E2’s	 chair.	 Accidently,	 she	 places	 a	
tissue	on	one	side	of	the	table.	Then	she	takes	two	soft	toys	out	of	
a	 bag	 saying	 “Look	what	 I	 got	 here,	 what’s	 that?	 Yes,	 a	 bunny!	
And	look	what	else	I	have!	A	bear!	I	put	them	both	here.	Okay”	E1	
leaves	 behind	 the	 curtains.	 E2	 re-enters	 the	 room	 and	 sees	 the	
toys:	“Wow!	A	bunny,	it’s	great!	And	a	bear!	It’s	great	too!”	Then	
she	 announces:	 “Oh	 no!	 I	 again	 forgot	 sth.,	 I	 have	 to	 leave	 for	
short.	I	put	these	two	in	this	box”	(she	takes	one	box	from	under	
the	table	and	places	it	at	the	other	side	than	the	tissue).		
Introduction	of	the	dual	aspect	objects	
E2	 announces:	 “Oh	 no,	 I	 forgot	 something!	 I	 have	 to	 leave	 for	
short.”	 and	 leaves.	 E1	 appears	 from	 behind	 the	 curtains,	 greets	
the	child	and	sits	down	at	E2’s	chair.	She	takes	one	soft	toys	out	of	
a	bag	saying	“Look	what	 I	got	here,	what’s	 that?	Yes,	a	bunny!	A	
bunny!	And	now	I	show	you	sth.:	the	bunny	is	also	a	carrot.	Where	
is	 the	 bunny	 now?	 Can	 you	make	 it	 so	 that	 it’s	 a	 bunny	 again?”	
The	child	 transforms	the	object,	 if	necessary	with	 the	help	of	E1.	
E1	emphasizes:	“And	Susi	doesn’t	know	that,	right?	Shh!	I	put	the	
bunny	here.	Okay”	E1	leaves	behind	the	curtains.	E2	re-enters	the	
room	 and	 sees	 the	 toy:	 “Wow!	 A	 bunny,	 it’s	 great!”	 Then	 she	
announces:	“Oh	no!	I	again	forgot	sth.,	I	have	to	leave	for	short.	I	
put	the	bunny	in	this	box”	(she	takes	one	box	from	under	the	table	
and	places	it	at	one	side	of	the	table).	
3	 Location-change	
False	belief:	E2	 leaves.	E1	appears	 from	behind	the	curtains	and	
says	“Shhh!	Hello	[name	of	child],	now	we	play	a	trick	on	[name	of	
E2]	Look,	what	I	do	now.	Okay.	Hihi.	Shh!”	She	takes	one	toy	out	
of	 the	 box	 and	 places	 it	 under	 the	 tissue	 in	 a	 sneaky	 way	
emphasizing	at	the	end:	“And	Susi	can’t	see	that,	right?	Shh!”	E1	
leaves	behind	the	curtains.	
True	Belief:	E1	appears	 from	behind	the	curtains	and	says	“Look	
[names	of	E2	and	child]	what	I	do	now!	Like	this	and	like	this!”	She	
takes	 one	 toy	 out	 of	 the	 box	 and	 places	 it	 under	 the	 tissue,	
thereby	 alternating	 gaze	 between	 the	 child	 and	 E2.	 E2	 observes	
this	 event	 closely	 saying	 ”Ah	 I	 see!	 Yes!”	 E1	 leaves	 behind	 the	
curtains	again.	E2	says	“But	now	I	have	to	leave,	I’ll	be	right	back”	
and	leaves.		
Aspect-change	
False	belief:	 E2	 leaves.	 E1	 appears	 from	behind	 the	 curtains	 and	
says	“Shh!	Hello	[name	of	child],	now	we	play	a	trick	on	[name	of	
E2]	Look,	what	I	do	now.	Okay.	Hihi.	Shh!”	She	takes	the	toy	out	of	
the	box,	transforms	it	into	its	2nd	aspect	in	a	sneaky	way	and	puts	
it	 back	 emphasizing	 at	 the	 end:	 “And	 Susi	 can’t	 see	 that,	 right?	
Shh!”	E1	leaves	behind	the	curtains.	
True	Belief:	 E1	appears	 from	behind	 the	curtains	and	 says	 “Look	
[names	of	E2	and	child]	what	I	do	now!	Like	this	and	like	this!”	She	
takes	the	toy	out	of	the	box,	transforms	 it	 into	 its	2nd	aspect	 in	a	
sneaky	way	and	puts	it	back,	thereby	alternating	gaze	between	the	
child	and	E2.	E2	observes	this	event	closely	saying	”Ah	I	see!	Yes!”	
E1	 leaves	 behind	 the	 curtains	 again.	 E2	 says	 “But	 now	 I	 have	 to	
leave,	I’ll	be	right	back”	and	leaves.	
4	 The	signal	
E2	re-enters	the	room,	stands	at	the	table,	says	“Okay!”	and	grasps	into	the	box.	She	takes	one	object	out	of	the	box	and	puts	it	beside	
the	box	(the	object	now	laying	at	the	center	of	the	table).	Then	she	moves	her	hand	further	in	the	box,	as	if	searching	for	sth.	saying	
“Hm?	Eh?	I	don’t	understand.	But	where	is?”	If	the	child	had	not	reacted	until	now,	E2	sits	down	at	her	chair	says	“Hmm”,	looks	at	the	
child	and	asks	”Can	you	help	me?”	She	repeats	this	once	if	the	child	does	not	react.	If	the	child	helps	to	search	in	the	box	or	gives	the	
object	under	the	tissue	(non-aspectual	task)/the	object	at	the	table	(aspectual	task),	E2	thanks	the	child.	If	the	child	shows	no	reaction	
or	a	reaction	different	from	these	three	categories,	E2	says	“Come	on	we	play	another	game	and	removes	the	box	and	object	to	begin	a	
second	trial	with	a	different	box	and	different	target	objects.	
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Coding.	As	 in	Exp.	1,	 the	 first	 reaction	 to	 the	signal	was	coded	and	 it	was	determined	
whether	it	fell	into	one	of	the	two	central	categories:		
  help	 to	 search	 in	 the	box:	 if	 the	 child,	 in	 response	 to	 the	 signal,	 touched	 the	box,	
pulled	a	grip,	opened	one	of	the	doors,	tried	to	look	inside	etc.	
  give	 the	 object	 (under	 the	 tissue	 in	 the	 non-aspectual	 task/on	 the	 table	 in	 the	
aspectual	 task):	 if	 the	 child,	 in	 response	 to	 the	 signal,	 took	 the	 object	 under	 the	
tissue	or	on	the	table	or	pointed	to	the	object.	
Compared	to	Exp.	1,	the	setting	of	Exp.	2	allowed	for	a	larger	range	of	behaviors	which	could	
not	clearly	be	coded	as	one	of	the	above	categories	and	were	cautiously	assigned	to	one	of	
the	following	two	other	categories:			
  ambiguous:	this	coding	applied		
(i)	 if	 the	 child	 showed	a	behavior	 that	 clearly	was	a	 reaction	 to	 the	 signal	 (i.e.	 the	
child’s	 behavior	 began	 after	 E2’s	 searching	 behavior	 and	 not	 already	 before)	 but	
which	did	not	fit	either	of	the	two	above	categories	(e.g.	the	child	did	perform	both	
above	behaviors,	for	example	pulling	on	the	tissue/taking	the	not-referred-to	object	
(aspectual	 tasks)	 and	 touching	 the	 box	 simultaneously,	 and	 it	was	 not	 clear	which	
reaction	was	a	response	to	the	searching	behavior	of	E2)	and		
(ii)	 if	 the	 child’s	 behavior	 was	 not	 clearly	 a	 reaction	 to	 the	 signal	 (i.e.	 the	 child	
referenced	the	hidden/transformed	object	or	began	to	explore	the	box	already	at	a	
time	point	before	E2	started	to	search	further	in	the	box	and	this	behavior	merged	
with	the	child’s	behavior	after	the	signal).		
(iii)	if	the	child	produced	a	response	to	the	signal	which	did	not	fit	either	of	the	two	
above	 categories	 (e.g.	 giving	 the	 first	 object	 taken	 out	 in	 the	 non-aspectual	 task)	
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which	 could	 not	 certainly	 be	 assigned	 to	 one	 of	 the	 categories	 were	 coded	 as	
ambiguous.		
  invalid:	this	coding	was	given	if	the	child	did	not	show	any	reaction,	if	the	child	left	
the	scene	during	the	trial	or	did	not	pay	attention	to	the	event	sequence.		
A	third	observer	who	was	blind	to	the	experimental	condition	and	hypotheses	coded	a	20%	
sample	of	27	randomly	selected	tapes	(36	trials)	for	reliability	which	was	к	=	.96	for	the	four-
category-coding	(open	box	1,	open	box	2/give	object,	invalid,	ambiguous).	
	
	
Results	
For	 28	 children	 (10	 in	 the	 Loc_FB,	 6	 in	 the	 Loc_TB,	 3	 in	 the	 Asp_FB	 and	 9	 in	 the	
Asp_TB	condition)	both	trials	were	coded	as	invalid	because	the	child	showed	no	reaction	to	
the	 signal	 (N	 =	20),	was	 inattentive	 (N	=	3),	or	 afraid	 (N	=	1),	or	because	of	experimental	
error	(N	=	4).	Data	from	109	children	were	thus	included	in	the	final	analysis.	Mean	age	was	
M	=	26;2	 (SD	 =	2.14,	11	girls,	15	boys)	 in	 the	non-aspectual	 FB	condition,	M	 =	26;2	 (SD	 =	
1.73,	11	girls,	14	boys)	in	the	non-aspectual	TB	condition,	M	=	26;1	(SD	=	1.95,	14	girls,	13	
boys)	 in	 the	 aspectual	 FB	 and	M	 =	 25;3	 (SD	 =	 1.87,	 14	 girls,	 17	boys)	 in	 the	 aspectual	 TB	
condition.	There	was	no	significant	age	difference	between	conditions	(F(3)	=	1.24,	p	=	.300).	
Trials	coded	as	ambiguous	or	invalid.	Of	the	109	included	children,	the	first	trial	was	
coded	as	invalid	in	13	cases	(3	in	the	Loc_FB,	3	in	the	Loc_TB,	5	in	the	Asp_FB	and	2	in	the	
Asp_TB	condition)	due	to	experimental	error	(N	=	2),	because	a	parent	or	sibling	interfered	
(N	 =	 4),	 the	 child	 did	 not	 react	 to	 the	 signal	 (N	 =	 4)	 or	was	 inattentive	 (N	=	 3).	 Of	 these	
children	2	(1	 in	the	Loc_FB	and	1	 in	the	Asp_TB	condition)	received	an	ambiguous	code	in	
the	second	trial.	For	6	children	both	trials	were	coded	as	ambiguous	(1	in	the	Loc_FB,	3	in	
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the	Asp_FB	and	2	in	the	Asp_TB	condition).	22	children	(5	in	the	Loc_FB,	1	in	the	Loc_TB,	9	
in	the	Asp_FB	and	7	in	the	Asp_TB	condition)	received	an	ambiguous	code	in	the	first	trial.	
Of	those,	5	children	(1	in	Loc_FB,	1	in	Asp_FB,	3	in	Asp_TB)	received	an	invalid	coding	in	the	
second	trial.	All	in	all	there	were	51	children	in	the	non-aspectual	conditions	and	58	children	
in	 the	aspectual	 conditions	who	 received	at	 least	one	valid	 (including	ambiguous)	 trial,	of	
which	48	children	per	condition	had	at	least	one	valid	unambiguous	trial	in	each	case.	
	
Main	analyses.	As	 in	Exp.	1,	 for	 the	main	analysis	 the	 first	 valid	 and	unambiguous	
trial	of	the	96	children	to	which	this	applied	was	used	(see	Figure	6).	Invalid	and	ambiguous	
trials	were	replaced	by	the	second	trial	 if	this	was	a	valid	trial.	Children’s	helping	behavior	
differed	 significantly	 between	 FB	 and	TB	 condition	 in	 the	non-aspectual	 task	 (N	 =	 48,	p	 =	
.018,	ΦCramer	=	.354,	one-tailed	Fisher’s	exact	test).	In	the	aspectual	task	helping	behavior	did	
not	differ	significantly	between	FB	and	TB	condition	(N	=	48,	p	=	 .207,	ΦCramer	=	 .163,	one-
tailed	Fisher’s	exact	test).		
Complementary	 analysis.	When	 comparing	 the	 non-aspectual	 and	 aspectual	 tasks	
for	FB	and	TB,	respectively,	results	revealed	that	children	tended	to	perform	differently	 in	
the	location	than	in	the	aspectual	TB	tasks	(opening	box	1	more	often	in	the	location	than	in	
the	aspectual	TB	tasks,	p	=	.049,	one-tailed	Fisher’s	exact	test).	No	differences	were	found	
for	the	two	FB	tasks	(p	=	.379).	
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	 	 	 (a)		 	 	 	 	 	 (b)	
Figure	 6.	 Number	 of	 children	 showing	 the	 different	 kinds	 of	 helping	 behavior	 in	 the	 first	 valid	 and	
unambiguous	trial	(a)	the	non-aspectual	tasks,	(b)	the	aspectual	task.	[*p	<	.05]	
	
	
Analyses	 including	 ambiguous	 trials.	 The	 results	 of	 the	 main	 analysis	 were	
confirmed	in	analyses	also	including	ambiguous	responses	in	the	analyses	as	a	third	category	
(see	 Table	 3):	 the	 difference	 between	 conditions	 in	 the	 non-aspectual	 task	 remained	
significant	 (N	 =	51,	p	 =	 .004,	VCramer	=	 .461,	 two-tailed	Fisher’s	exact	 test),	whereas	 in	 the	
aspectual	 task	FB	and	TB	conditions	did	not	differ	 significantly	 (N	 =	58,	p	 =	 .228,	VCramer	=	
.207,	two-tailed	Fisher’s	exact	test).		
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Table	3.	Helping	behavior	in	the	first	valid	trial	including	ambiguous	responses.	
	 Non-aspectual	task	 Aspectual	task	
	 TB	 FB	 TB	 FB	
help	to	search	in	box	 23	 13	 18	 11	
give	object	 1	 7	 5	 7	
ambiguous	response	 1	 6	 7	 10	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
